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DEFINING “PROFITS” FOR BRITISH
INCOME TAX PURPOSES: A
CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF THE
DEPRECIATION CASES, 1875-1897
Abstract: Seven British income tax disputes over depreciation (18751897) are analyzed in this contextual study. The legal cases reveal
how uncertainty over meanings for “depreciation,” “profits,” and
“capital” reflected social and political tensions which had commercial
accounting implications. Case analysis yields evidence of how judicial
support reinforced the Inland Revenue’s technical authority over a
competing tax administration institution and enabled its modern
regulatory control over taxpayers to be constructed. The British example illustrates the ways in which technical and administrative
practices may emerge from the contestation of meanings that takes
place both in a wide political context and within particular institutional settings.

INTRODUCTION
This paper is a contextual study of seven British income tax
cases reported between 1875 and 1897. Each case concerns a
dispute between tax officials and taxpayers over the treatment of
depreciation in the calculation of taxable profits. Not only does
the problem of “depreciation” represent a significant theme in
early income tax history, but the tax treatment of depreciation is
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ment of commercial accounting practices. In 1881, the Coltness
case established the leading tax principle that amounts incurred
in the acquisition of a capital asset, even when allocated over
the useful life of the asset, are not deductible in computing the
profits of a trade [Tiley and Collison, 1999, p. 427]. Cases before
1881 reveal the development of the judicial principle, and cases
after 1881 reveal how distinctive tax rules were applied.
The purpose of the paper is to consider how the decisions in
the tax depreciation cases affected tax practice and an emergent
accounting measurement practice. In these cases, we find evidence of how the Inland Revenue used the support of the courts
to reinforce its regulatory control over taxpayers and technical
authority over a competing tax administration institution, the
local General Commissioners of Income Tax. In addition, the
cases provide evidence of alternative meanings for and measurement practices associated with “depreciation,” “profits,” and
“capital.” As Parker [1994] points out, the meanings of these
words for other purposes were unsettled and changing in this
period. No consensus existed that depreciation was a measure of
the cost or valuation of the economic benefits of tangible fixed
assets consumed during an accounting period, and, as such, that
depreciation represented a writing off of capital in the annual
calculation of profits. An analysis of the institutional politics of
the tax depreciation cases also lends support to an explanation
why the judiciary abjured precise definition of “profits” for income tax or dividend distribution purposes. Judges left themselves flexibility to change regulatory concepts of calculation
when judicial definitions were abstract and not defined in much
detail. Thus, they were better able to avoid the creation of regulatory conflicts between income tax and other areas of their
jurisdiction. The paper concludes that, with judicial support, the
Inland Revenue was able to construct de facto regulatory control
of the income tax. Judicial decisions reinforced taxing practices
based on writing, interpretation, and examination of texts, and
extended calculation. Such practices formed the basis for the
disciplinary power of the modern Revenue and supplanted taxation based on the exercise of sovereign power.
The political, legal, and institutional context for the tax depreciation cases is developed by reference to related cases and
documentary sources, including reports of Parliamentary Select
Committee (SC) and Commissioners of Inland Revenue (CIR).
In the depreciation cases themselves, we can find evidence concerning processes of accounting for taxable profits, as well as
“the court’s narration of . . . particular accounting principle[s]
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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. . . buried in the dicta” or to be inferred from other details
[Mills, 1993, p. 766]. Close examination of court judgments and
consideration of the wider context suggest how the courts might
have intervened to support particular social, political, or economic outcomes [French, 1977; Reid, 1987; Bryer, 1998].
Hopwood and Johnson [1986] challenged accounting historians to study accounting practices in the social, economic, and
institutional contexts in which they operate, and Hopwood
[1983] urged researchers to explore how accounting shapes the
way in which organizations function. Taxation is an arena for
accounting that has not been studied in much detail from these
perspectives. A few studies [Preston, 1989; Boden, 1999] research taxation as a social and institutional practice, but modern practice is their focus. Lamb [2001] begins to redress the
taxation gap in the “new accounting history” literature [Miller et
al., 1991] with a study of accountability in mid-19th century
British tax assessment practices. The present paper continues
this analysis of accountability in the late 19th century. It is also
a response to calls for more studies of accounting and the law
[Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992; Freedman and Power, 1992]. It
considers “issues such as how and why accounting and the law
intersect, whether this is due to certain fundamental limits that
law encounters in seeking to regulate certain practices, and
what happens to both accounting and law when such intersections take place” [Miller and Power, 1992, p. 230].
This paper reflects upon how concepts of “profits,” “capital,” and “depreciation” emerged in the legal practices of “income” taxation, starting from a recognition that these concepts
are not and never were self-evident [Hopwood and Johnson,
1986, p. 39]. It supplements prior accounting history studies of
“the nature and significance of legal interventions in accounting
processes” [Mills, 1993, p. 765] and seeks better understanding
of the common law on accounting, broadly defined to cover
commercial accounting, accounting for distributable profits,
and accounting for taxable profits.
Contestation of meanings: As Martin Daunton [2001, p. 389] argues, “the language of taxation permeates the history of Britain”
in the 19th century, and taxation was “a central element” in
important political debates concerned with the ordering and
conduct of society, economy, the State, and its institutions. By
the 1870s many of the debating positions, claims, and institutional characters could be recognized. In 1875 representatives of
the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce petitioned the Treasury and
Published by eGrove, 2002
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the Inland Revenue in London for a change of law to permit
trading concerns an income tax deduction for depreciation.
Many examples were catalogued, including several court cases,
where businesses had been denied an equitable deduction for
depreciation. By early 1877, the lobby to introduce the depreciation allowance had become a “movement” [CIR, 1878b, p. 64].
The prominent accountant, company promoter, and Member of
Parliament David Chadwick supported the change. During the
1877 budget debates, Chadwick “submitted that the incidence of
the income tax and the mode of assessment were most unjust
and inconsistent” because of the absence of a depreciation allowance [Hansard, 12 April 1877, col. 1029]. In committee, he
repeated his claim: “[Income tax was] a very good and very
honest tax; but as one most unjustly and inequitably levied.. . . .
Take trade. The mine owner had to pay on his capital as well as
his income. So also had the cotton-spinner, neither being allowed anything whatever for the annual depreciation of their
property” [Hansard, 16 April 1877, cols. 1242-1243].
An attempt to introduce a depreciation allowance through
the 1877 Budget Bill was rejected by the House of Commons
[CIR, 1878a, p. 54]. The Chambers of Commerce made further
representations to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Revenue took steps to clarify the position. This agency, which represented the interests of the Exchequer in income tax administration, argued that existing tax law already gave taxpayers the
equivalent of the depreciation allowance that the Chambers
sought and the issue was one of lack of uniformity of practice by
tax authorities across the UK. In June 1877 the Revenue sent a
circular letter to all local Commissioners of Income Tax that
made clear the Revenue’s belief that the lobby for the change in
tax legislation “must have arisen from the provisions of the Income Tax Acts not being clearly understood” [CIR, 1878b, p. 64].
The statutory allowance for repairs, it argued, could be interpreted to cover a provision for depreciation, narrowly interpreted as “wear and tear”. The letter was one of numerous instances in which the Revenue attempted to demonstrate its
technical authority over the local Commissioners who had formal legal authority to administer the income tax.
Notwithstanding the Revenue’s efforts at clarification, further representations were made in 1878 and Parliament agreed
to change the law. Income tax law thereafter officially sanctioned allowances given by the Commissioners for “wear and
tear”. The new law was limited in scope, and not a comprehensive allowance for depreciation. The judicial case law reviewed
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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in this paper confirms this. “Depreciation” was not a word that
appeared in the Taxes Acts, but the contentions of taxpayers and
the tax authorities before the courts sought to establish a relationship between this measurement concept and words that did
appear in the Acts: “income,” “profits” and “capital”. The depreciation tax cases created meanings for these terms that were
essentially different from their meanings in commercial accounting and other areas of judicial law.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first part develops the
theoretical and historiographic underpinnings of this study. An
outline of the legal basis for and practices of calculation of taxable profits in the mid- to late-19th century comes next. Then,
the tax depreciation cases and their implications are examined.
Finally, the arguments and evidence presented in the paper are
discussed and summarized.
THEORY AND PRIOR LITERATURE
Regulatory Control of the Income Tax: 19th century income taxes
were unpopular because they required “vexatious inquisition”
into taxpayers’ personal affairs and they incorporated features
that were often labeled “inequitable”. Early income taxes were
tolerated as war taxes. In England, the income tax was an important, temporary part of the fiscal system during the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815), but was rescinded in 1816 as soon as the
wars ended. The income tax was reintroduced in 1842 as part of
wider fiscal reform, and Daunton [2001] argues that it formed a
generally accepted, even if never popular, part of Britain’s stable
“fiscal constitution” from that time until the 1890s. The relatively high levels of trust in the British fiscal system could be
attributed, Daunton argues [2001, Ch. 1] to interactions between
four factors. These were the institutional and administrative
processes for collecting revenue; the way in which assessed taxable capacity interacted with economic change; the manner in
which the fiscal system was reformed; and the patterns of public
spending. Relatively high levels of public trust led in turn to a
comparatively high level of voluntary compliance to tax. The
acceptability and stability of income tax at the macro-level, however, rested in large part on the ability of social, political, and
administrative institutions to accommodate complaints, challenges, and negotiation over the details of taxation at the microlevel.
Effective administration was essential to the success of the
income tax. Historical studies of income tax make these points
Published by eGrove, 2002
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clear in a comparative sense [Grossfeld and Bryce, 1983;
Daunton, 2001, Chs. 1 and 7], as well as specifically in connection with the US [Samson, 1985] and the UK [Sabine, 1966].
Webber and Wildavsky [1986, pp. 300-301] state that in Britain,
as in the US and elsewhere, professionalized, centralized public
tax administration and government’s heavy reliance on direct
taxation of income and profits necessarily go together, and both
features of modern systems of taxation are legacies of the 19th
century. It is a paradox that the Inland Revenue did not gain
formal authority for tax assessment from the local General Commissioners until the 20th century [Stebbings, 1993, p. 53]. Lamb
[2001] argues that it is the de facto regulatory control established gradually by the Revenue during the 19th century that
made modern income tax such an effective part of the British
tax system. The construction of a web of rules and practices by
the Revenue to supplement the written law underlies the modern disciplinary power of the agency [Preston, 1989] and forms
an important element of a history of comparatively high levels
of public trust in the British taxation system [Daunton, 2001].
This paper is informed by a Foucauldian approach to regulation that distinguishes “sovereign” and “disciplinary” modes of
power [Foucault, 1975; Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1994; Boland,
1987; Miller and O’Leary, 1987; Preston, 1989; Miller, 1990,
1994]. Lamb [2001] argues that the overt exercise of sovereign
power, essentially unmediated through any “objective” routines
of calculation, was the basis for regulatory control in 1855. After
1855 a shift in the mode of regulatory control occurred. A system of governance based on disciplinary power emerged once
tax authorities developed ways of obtaining comprehensive
knowledge of the taxpayer through writing, examination, and
calculation. It was also necessary for the officers of the Inland
Revenue to become the lead agents in the exercise of regulatory
control, supplanting local Commissioners who had exercised
regulatory control based on older traditions of governance
[ibid.].
The concept of “regulation” in this paper includes the process of making and then enforcing legal rules, as well as other
processes of intervention and control of the objects of regulation
[Hancher and Moran, 1989, p. 3]. As with any political process,
regulation involves contests for power, and cultural forces and
structures shape it [op. cit., p. 4]. Hancher and Moran emphasize the “impact of cultural influences on the organizational
character of regulation” [op. cit., p. 5]. A study of tax regulation
involves examination of the processes of making and enforcing
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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formal tax law, as well as the ways in which tax authorities seek
to exercise control in micro- and macro-political processes. The
interaction of taxation with regulation of commercial accounting (e.g. financial reporting under company law) is well recognized [e.g. Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992; Lamb et al., 1998].
“Regulatory control” is the regulator’s operational purpose
for employing legal rules and other processes of control. This
state is achieved when the regulator’s power is recognized by
regulatees, and sufficient regulatees comply with the regulator’s
requirements for the exercise of regulation to be perceived as
effective. This outcome is often referred to as “voluntary compliance.” Regulatory control may be seen to be adequate, but it is
usually incomplete. Ambiguity and complexity of tax law interact in practice to create space for taxpayer creativity and noncompliance with the intentions of tax law [Miller and Power,
1992]. Tax law is “formalist”1 in nature and, consequently, legal
control is elusive [McBarnet and Whelan, 1992]. Tensions arise
from the incompleteness of regulatory control.
In this paper we consider some of the tensions surrounding
the making and enforcing of tax law that have implications for
less formal ways of constructing regulatory control as well. In
the analysis of the tax depreciation cases that follows, we seek to
highlight elements of legal and accounting practice that assisted
the tax authorities in constructing adequate regulatory control.
We pay close attention to factors that reinforce the de facto
authority of the Revenue. The ways in which the courts approached interpretation of tax law are particularly relevant to
the construction of the Revenue’s regulatory control.
Profit Measurement for Income Tax and Commercial Accounting:
For businesses, the connection between income tax and commercial accounting is fundamental. Both processes measure
profits of the entity, based on the same pool of transactions. A
legal distinction between calculations of profit for tax and for
commercial accounting purposes became explicit in 1878 when
a statutory allowance was introduced to tax law as a (partial)
substitute for commercial measures of depreciation [Edwards,
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1979]. Before 1878 the Revenue
1
“Formalism” means “‘to be governed by the rigidity of a rule’s formulation’
[and] assumes that law is ‘intelligible as an internally coherent phenomenon,’
that there is consistency, predictability, logical coherence and ultimately autonomy and ‘closure’: a systemic isolation of the legal system from such things
as politics and culture” [McBarnet and Whelan, 1992, p. 81].
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asserted that such a distinction was implicit in tax law, but the
agency’s relative lack of authority meant that its interpretation
was not generally accepted. The House of Lords accepted the
Revenue’s analysis in Coltness [1881], but within a decade the
court institutionalized a reconnection between profit measurement for income tax and commercial accounting purposes. This
did not represent a dramatic about-face or the loss of regulatory
control by the Revenue. Instead, it reflected judicial support for
Revenue practices that rested on detailed sequences of regulated
calculation that could be documented in written and examinable
forms. Such judicial support and sequences of regulated calculation are features of British income tax that emerged during the
second half of the 19th century.
Today we take it for granted in a UK context that taxable
profits and distributable profits are regulated concepts that are
legally distinct [e.g. Edwards, 1976; Freedman, 1987, 1997;
Whittington, 1995]. The Gresham [1892] decision provided
settled law that a tax computation of profit starts with a measurement of profit based on “ordinary principles of commercial
trading” [Freedman, 1987; Boden, 1999, p. 46]. Thereafter, adjustments are made in accordance with tax law to arrive at a
measurement of taxable profits. The extent to which the commercial measurement of profit requires adjustment for tax purposes remains a matter of legal and policy debate. One of the
biggest problems of tax practice is the extent to which the law,
and particularly the courts, will be guided by accountancy practices [Tiley and Collison, 1999, p. 340].2 Freedman [1987] argues
that the courts have adopted a “see saw” attitude to the extent to
which they are willing to be guided by accountancy practices.
Existing literature in accounting and legal history tends to
start from an understanding of the modern relationship between
tax law and accounting practice and pay little attention to the
2
UK courts currently approach the problem by looking first “to see what
accountancy says and then see whether any rule of law contradicts it” [Tiley and
Collison, 1999, p. 340]. Recent case law suggests that judge-made law could not
override “a generally accepted rule of commercial accountancy which (a) applied to the situation in question, (b) was not one of two or more rules applicable to that situation, and (c) was not shown to be inconsistent with the true
facts or otherwise inapt to determine the true profits or losses of the business”
[Ibid.]. The Inland Revenue has stated that it “will accept a generally accepted
accounting practice which does not violate any rules of tax [Inland Revenue,
1995]. Sect. 42 FA 1998 requires Schedule D Case I and II profits to be computed on an accounting basis that gives a “true and fair view,” and places even
more reliance on commercial accounting; see CCH [2000, pp. 952-405].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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emergence of a legal and practical understanding of the connection between the two forms of regulated calculation. Further,
most literature rests on an acceptance of the “essential difference” between the two measures of profits. As income tax was
introduced in 1799 before generally accepted principles of commercial accounting existed, Edwards [1976, p. 302] argues that
tax authorities were “obliged” to devise “their own rules” for
calculating profits. He goes on to argue that commercial accounting did not follow the lead of income tax accounting because the separate purposes of taxable profit measurement and
commercial profit measurement were clearly understood [p.
300]. Freedman [1997, p. 32] argues that “[a] culture was created in which a divergence of taxable profits from accounting
profits could evolve without causing any great surprise”. In
other words, it became “natural” for tax calculations and accounting calculations to be different. In this paper, it is argued
that such divergence was constructed and recognized relatively
slowly.
There have been many contextual studies of 19th century
profit measurement in the UK [e.g. Reid, 1987; Edwards, 1989;
Bryer, 1991, 1993, 1998; Maltby, 1999], but few examine interrelationships between tax and accounting in much detail.
Edwards [1976] is an exception, and he studies tax influence on
the development of capital expenditure accounting.3 His work
considers how tax capital accounting rules influenced commercial accounting profit measurement. Edwards [1976, p. 314]
concludes that:
. . . early tax law and practice retarded the development
of accounting theory, both directly through the incentive provided to write off capital expenditure to revenue, in the year that the outlay occurred, in order to
increase the likelihood of attracting some relief, and
indirectly through the implied official approval for the
failure to depreciate a wide range of capital assets.
Watts and Zimmerman [1979, p. 45] consider tax influence
in some detail and argue that the 1878 tax depreciation allowance was an important cause of the development of depreciation
accounting theory. Bryer [1993, p. 657] refutes this by demonstrating earlier use and acceptance of depreciation accounting,
3
Edwards [1976] considers three tax depreciation cases examined in this
paper: Forder, Knowles, and Coltness. He seeks to trace the pattern of tax influence on commercial capital accounting from its origins to the modern period.
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but in turn highlights another way in which capital accounting
interacted with tax practice, viz. valuation adjustments.
Lamb [1997b, Ch. 6; 2001] presents evidence that commercial calculations of profits were accepted as taxable profits for
the early British income tax [1799-1816], as well as after the tax
was reintroduced in 1842. This is acknowledged by other authors [e.g. Edwards, 1976]. In the paper that follows, it is argued
that the introduction of “their own rules” by the tax authorities
was problematic and gradual, and the distinction between profits for tax purposes and profits for other purposes was accepted
slowly. A distinction of purpose was only gradually confirmed
by the judgments of the courts in the late 19th century. Further,
it will be argued, this process of changing rules and understandings of the relationships between tax and accounting was an
integral part of the construction of modern regulatory control
by British income tax authorities.
Dealing with Depreciation in Tax and Commercial Accounting:
Depreciation was a significant theme of early income tax cases
[CIR, 1878b, pp. liv-lvi]. The tax authorities’ disallowance of depreciation deductions was a major source of grievance among
taxpayers. The cases reveal the arguments and forms of analysis
employed by taxpayers, the Commissioners, the Revenue officers, and the judges. The concept of depreciation and the practices required to measure it were unsettled in the 19th century
[Brief, 1965; Edwards, 1989; Parker, 1994]. No generally accepted concept of depreciation, together with associated practices, existed when British income tax was introduced in 1799.
As the income tax developed, so too did accounting for depreciation. It is relevant to examine how regulatory control of income
tax was constructed in the context of changing and contested
commercial accounting practices.
The nature and significance of depreciation accounting is
contentious among accounting historians. It is common ground,
however, that accounting practices for dealing with the capital
cost of assets were not uniform, but varied between businesses,
even businesses in the same trade. Edwards [1989, pp. 114-115]
distinguishes between “repairs and renewals accounting”, “replacement accounting”, and “depreciation accounting” — all
widely used in the 19th century. The latter is closest to modern
generally accepted practices of depreciation accounting based
on systematic periodic allocation of fixed asset cost as a charge
against profit. One strand of historical analysis links the variability of depreciation practices to a failure to distinguish
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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systematically between capital and revenue expenditure [e.g.
Brief, 1965; Baldwin and Berry, 1999].4 Another strand of historical analysis does not explain the variability in the forms of
accounting for capital expenditure by reference to a failure to
distinguish systematically between capital and revenue. Napier
[1990], for example, finds that the changing pattern of depreciation practices is related to the commercial development of the
business.5 Elsewhere, Napier [1997] suggests that variability
may relate to the extent that the practices of aristocratic landowners persisted in particular lines of business.6 Bryer [1991,
1993] places more emphasis on dividend or profit manipulation
explanations for variability in depreciation practices.7
4
This failure, Brief [1965, p. 14] argues, explains why 19th century British
company financial reports have a propensity to contain a degree of “accounting
error.” Baldwin and Berry [1999] present some support for this view, but acknowledge the contentiousness of size estimates and the nature of errors. They
note [p. 93] capital accounting practices for four coal and iron companies: three
amortised the capital cost of fixed assets over the estimated useful lives of the
particular assets, and a fourth adopted replacement accounting.
5
Napier [1990] notes, in the case of P&O, that “[t]he notion of capital maintenance adopted . . . cannot . . . be easily labelled as a physical capital maintenance or a financial capital maintenance one” [p. 42]. The company had an
“ambivalence regarding the function of depreciation” [p. 43], and adopted a
primary understanding of depreciation as a source of funds for asset replacement and a secondary view of depreciation as a method of dividend smoothing
involving the creation of secret reserves.
6
Napier [1997, p. 3] explains that some forms of capital accounting practised by aristocratic landowners in the late 18th century persisted a century
later: “[M]any companies, particularly those like canals and railways . . . , were
accounted for as if they had some of the characteristics of aristocratic estates”.
7
Bryer [1991], analysing railway accounting, notes that “by the early 1840s
the principle of charging depreciation on rolling stock . . . was widely understood by those professionally interested in railways” [p. 448]. Abandonment of
depreciation during the “mania” of the mid-1840s and the hard times that followed led to the payment of dividends from capital. Bryer interprets the change
as part of a “swindle” “orchestrated . . . by the ‘London wealthy’ on the manufacturing and middle classes, who were lured into investing in railways during the
‘mania’” [p. 483]. As the price of stocks fell, the London wealthy invested heavily
in the railways. The adoption of replacement accounting rather than depreciation accounting in the last half of the 19th century can be seen as a way of
understating disclosed profits and staving off attempts by the state to regulate
railway profits any further [pp. 476-477, 483]. Bryer [1993] argues that “costbased accrual accounting,” which “encompasses both conventional historical
cost accounting and replacement cost accounting” [p. 649, fn.] was generally
agreed among leading 19th century accountants. Depreciation as the cost of
consumption and replacement of the use-values of assets is central to cost-based
accrual accounting [p. 655] and systematic depreciation accounting was in widespread use by 1880 [p. 674].
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The courts had an important role in articulating capital accounting, because they were required to adjudicate disputes under company law of permissible dividend payments. Dividends
could be paid out of “profits” but not out of “capital,” and the
courts had to consider how “depreciation” affected each of these
measures. The company law doctrine of capital maintenance
was a judicial construction rather than a specifically enacted
rule [French, 1977]. Bryer [1998] argues that a conceptual understanding of the “laws” of accounting (“capital-revenue accounting”) was shared by accountants and judges, and contrasts
his conclusions with the prevailing view that “consistent concepts of asset valuation and income determination are not evident” [Reid, 1987, p. 247]. Bryer argues that the judicial capital
maintenance rule, underpinned by the requirement to pay dividends from revenue, required capital-revenue accounting. This
requirement was enforced by judicial decisions until judges in
Lee v. Neuchatel [1888/89] refused to set aside a company’s own
constitutional rule that permitted the payment of a dividend to
reduce “fixed” capital.
Accounting historians have examined the dividend cases,
and in particular Lee, to understand how and why the courts
adopted the positions that they did on commercial accounting
regulation. Inasmuch as it relied on Adam Smith’s distinction
between “fixed” and “circulating” capital [Smith, 1776, Bk. 2,
Ch. 1], Napier [1997, p. 3] interprets Lee as a reflection of judicial attitudes “grounded in aristocratic approaches towards
capital and income in the context of landowning.” French [1977,
p. 306] interprets the court’s behavior as “an exercise of judicial
law reform” superimposed on a longstanding pattern of judicial
law making with respect to capital maintenance rules. He argues
that the judges’ intention was to “create economic freedom for
businessmen in dividend matters” [p. 318], but that they did so
in a manner that allowed them to respect case precedent: they
created “new definitions” and insisted that “each of the old rules
said a separate thing”. Bryer [1998] also explains the court’s
decision in Lee as an expression of new sensibilities of economic
efficiency. He argues that the decision reflected the judges’
awareness that the interests of social capital might be better
served if it was free to move to better investment opportunities.
Maltby [1999] follows Bryer’s line of argument, but suggests that
“it might have been expected that the courts would have provided authoritative and realistic guidance about the determination of profit” [p. 36]. She interprets the courts’ failure to provide such guidance as “a slump in judicial self-confidence when
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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it came to determining accounting rules” [ibid.].
These accounting historians offer insights into the analysis
of the tax depreciation cases. It is possible to relate the courts’
discussion of the appropriate treatment for tax purposes of depreciation attributable to wear and tear, exhaustion of capital,
obsolescence, or other losses in value to the development of
such accounting practices in other contexts. The tax cases may
also offer accounting historians with new clues to solve persistent puzzles of 19th century commercial profit measurement.
BACKGROUND TO THE DEPRECIATION CASES
Legal Basis of Income Taxation: The 1842 Act “for granting to
Her Majesty duties on Profits arising from Property, Professions, Trades, and Offices” [5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35] was the legal
basis for income tax in the late 19th century. In most significant
respects, this was a re-enactment of the income tax introduced
in 1799 to serve as a war tax; modified substantially in 1803 to
improve its effectiveness; and retired in 1816 once the Napoleonic Wars were over. The tax applied to individuals and legal
persons, such as companies.8 Three technical principles of the
tax were decisive for its ultimate success: a source concept, compulsory self-assessment, and tax stoppage at source [Grossfeld
and Bryce, 1983, p. 224].
Income tax was a Crown tax, approved by Parliament for a
fixed time: initially in 1842 for three years; then seven years; and
subsequently, usually one year at a time. By 1875 British income
tax was acknowledged to be de facto permanent [op. cit., p. 223;
Sabine, 1966, p. 111]. In the early Victorian period this tax was
known as the “property tax”. As Sabine [1966, p. 42 fn] noted,
“even down to the present day, there has been a certain confusion about the terms property tax and income tax. The title
‘Income Tax Acts’ was not introduced until quite late in the
Victorian era”. We will refer to the “income tax” throughout this
paper, but its early characterization as a “property tax” echoes
through the legal analysis of the depreciation cases.
The source principle of income tax meant that different detailed principles of measurement and collection of tax would
apply depending on the income source (referred to as a “Schedule”) [Boden, 1999; Lamb, 2001, p. 291]. Tax law identified two
8
In 1965 a separate Corporation Tax was introduced to tax the profits of
British companies. Under this tax, many of the principles of income tax continue
to apply in measuring profits chargeable to corporation tax.
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main types of business profits: profits derived from trade
(“Schedule D Case I”)9 and profits derived from the exploitation
of land (“Schedule A No. III”).10 “Trade” was a term that covered
a wide range of enterprises from the great commercial concerns
like the East India Company to the new industrial manufacturers to small shopkeepers. Schedule A No. III enterprises included mining companies, most public utilities, and the railroads. In the rest of this paper, the labels “Schedule D” and
“Schedule A” will refer to these specific types of businesses.
Deduction of income tax at source operated where possible.
This meant that tax was collected “from persons not directly
interested in its payment, and evasion was reduced because the
tax was deducted before the income reached the ultimate proprietor” [Soos, 1995, p. 49]. Recognition of income and deduction of tax at source were problematic for profits [SC, 1852a, q.
373-386, Pressly; Lamb, 2001, pp. 287-288]. Income tax on profits was ascertainable only after calculation and assessment.
Schedule D and Schedule A businesses had to file tax returns. In the words of the legislation, profit-making businesses
were obliged to: “prepare and deliver . . . a true and correct
Statement in Writing . . . containing . . . the Amount of the
Profits or Gains arising . . . from all and every the Sources
9
Under 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35, s. 100 there were six “cases” of Schedule D. It is
Schedule D, Case I that is most relevant to this paper: “Duties to be charged in
respect of any Trade, Manufacture, Adventure, or Concern in the Nature of
Trade, not contained in any other Schedule of this Act.” The other Schedule D
cases were: II “ . . . Professions, Employments, or Vocations . . . ;” III “ . . . Profits
of an uncertain annual Value . . . ;” IV “ . . . Interest arising from . . . Foreign Securities . . . ;” V “ . . . Foreign Possessions . . . ;” and VI “ . . . any annual Profits or
Gains not . . . charged by virtue of any . . . other [Case or ] Schedule . . . .”
10
There were three types of rules that applied to land revenues. Schedule A,
No. I related to land generally — if it did not fall into a more specialised category — and it was assessed as an “annual value,” usually understood to be rent.
Schedule A, No. I is the category often referred to as Schedule A [e.g. Daunton,
2001, p. 185], but such description risks missing subtle but important distinctions. There were two specialised Schedule A categories. Schedule A, No. II
applied to tithes in kind, ecclesiastical dues, manors, fines, and other profits
from land. Schedule A, No. III applied to “commercial enterprises derived from
the exploitation of land.” It is this last category of Schedule A that is most
relevant to this paper. 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35, s. 60 deems the “annual Value” for
such “Properties” to be “the full Amount for One Year, or the Average Amount
for One Year, of the Profits received therefrom within the respective Times
herein limited. Of quarries . . . , of mines . . . , of ironworks, gasworks, . . . waterworks, . . . canals, . . . docks, . . . railways and other ways, . . . and other concerns
of the like nature, from or arising out of any lands, tenements, hereditaments, or
heritages . . . .”
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chargeable . . . , according to the respective Schedules” [5 & 6
Vict., ch. 35, s. 52]. To this statement, the taxpayer was obliged
to add a declaration that taxable income was “estimated . . .
after setting against or deducting from such Profits or Gains
such Sums, and no other, as are allowed by this Act” [ibid.].11
Tax law specified rules to calculate assessable profits. One type
of rule determined if profits were recognized for a particular
one-year period, or if profits were the average profits of a longer
period. Schedule D trading concerns were taxed upon “a fair
and just Average of Three Years.” Under Schedule A, mining
concerns were taxed on the basis of five years’ average profits,
while other Schedule A trading companies were taxed on the
basis of profits in the preceding year. “Profits” were stated to be
taxable, and there were numerous rules listing costs that would
not be regarded as acceptable deductions from profits — some
very abstract and general, others quite specific [see Figure 1].
Income Tax Practice — Administration: Income taxation was formally a system of self-assessment, but taxpayers were accountable to tax administrators with legal and practical powers to
enforce taxation and collection. Two administratively distinct
bodies of tax officials had responsibilities for income tax in 19th
century Britain. Local Commissioners and their clerks and collectors formed one body, while local Surveyors, their supervisors and other officials12 of the central Inland Revenue formed
the other. These were not institutions of equal size. As Daunton
[2001, p. 192] notes, “What stands out in the mid-nineteenth
century is the small scale of the [Revenue] bureaucracy required
by the income tax”. In the 1860s Revenue officers numbered less
than 400, whereas the body of local Commissioners and all of
their officers numbered more than 50,000 [op. cit., pp. 188,
192]. Lamb [2001, p. 281, Fig. 1 and related text] discusses the
responsibilities of and relationships between these officials. Sovereign powers to tax and regulate the taxpayer belonged to local
Commissioners who were powerful public officials independent
of central government [Lamb, 2001]. Ex post facto, the Revenue
is identified as the creator of tax rules and practices [Edwards,
11
The tax return required of a mining company in 1878 is reproduced in
Coltness, 1881, pp. 302-304.
12
Surveyors were the 19th century equivalent of modern H. M. Inspectors of
Taxes. Special Commissioners were central Inland Revenue employees who
could act in place of local General Commissioners in certain circumstances if
the taxpayer so wished.
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FIGURE 1
Rules for the Calculation of Schedule D Profits
Rules for Trading and Professional Profits
st

1

2nd

“In estimating the Balance of the Profits or Gains . . . ,”
[i]
“no Sum shall be . . . deducted from . . . such Profits or Gains, for any
Disbursements or Expences whatever, not being Money wholly and
exclusively laid out or expended for the Purposes of such trade . . . ;”
[ii]
“nor for any Disbursements or Expences of Maintenance of the Parties, their Families or Establishments; . . . ”
Profit and gains arising from property occupied by the trade will be dealt
with under Schedule A. . . .
Rules for Trading Profits Only

st

1

2nd

3rd

4th

Tax was “to be charged . . . on a Sum not less than the full Amount of the
Balance of the Profits or Gains of such Trade . . . , and shall be assessed,
charged, and paid without other Deduction than is herein-after allowed
. . . .”
Tax “shall extend to every Person, Body Politic, or Corporate, . . . Company, or
Society, and to every Art, Mystery, Adventure, or concern carried on by them
. . . in Great Britain or elsewhere” except such businesses or properties as
were charged under Schedule A,” i.e. income from land and businesses
based on the exploitation of land - mines, roads, railways, canals, waterworks, etc.
“In estimating the Balance of Profits and Gains chargeable . . . , no Sum
shall be. . . deducted from . . . such Profits or Gains . . .”
[i]
“on account of
• any Sum expended for Repairs of Premises occupied for the Purpose of such Trade . . . ,”
• nor for any Sum expended for the Supply of Repairs or Alterations
of any Implements, Utensils, or Articles employed for the Purpose
of such Trade . . . beyond the Sum usually expended for such
purposes, according to an Average of Three Years preceding the
Year in which such Assessment shall be made”;
[ii]
“nor on account of Loss not connected with or arising out of such
Trade . . . ;”
[iii] “nor on account of any Capital withdrawn therefrom;”
[iv] “nor for any Sum employed or intended to be employed as Capital in
such Trade . . . ;”
[v]
“nor for any Capital employed in Improvement of Premises occupied
for the Purposes of such Trade . . . ;”
[vi] “nor on account or under Pretence of any Interest which might have
been made on such Sums if laid out at Interest;”
[vii] “nor for any Debts, except bad Debts proved to be such to the Satisfaction of the Commissioners respectively;”
[viii] “nor for any average Loss beyond the actual Amount of Loss after
Adjustment;” . . . .
“In estimating the Amount of the Profits and Gains . . . no Deduction shall
be made on account of any annual Interest, or any Annuity or other annual
Payment, payable out of such Profits or Gains”.

Source: 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35. sect. 100, italics added.
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1976] and capable of governing taxpayers through a nexus of
disciplinary technologies [Preston, 1989].
Until the Revenue gained de facto power to assess tax and
determine the liability through procedure, local Commissioners
were habituated to exercise their sovereign powers to estimate
tax liabilities based on local knowledge and their discretion, as
well as force a substantial proportion of taxpayers to appear in
person before them for judgment and assessment [Lamb, 2001].
Revenue officers were more inclined to gain knowledge of taxpayers through the collection, creation, and analysis of written
evidence [ibid.]. In 1848 the Inland Revenue was formed by a
merger of the Board of Stamps and Taxes with the Board of
Excise [CIR, 1885, p. 95]. The Excise, the model professional
department of 18th century tax administration [Brewer, 1989,
Ch. 4], was a highly centralized, effective department by the
mid-19th century, and its practices helped strengthen central
government administration of the income tax. By the 1860s the
income tax had been recognized as de facto permanent part of
the department’s workload [Sabine, 1966, p. 90]. By 1870 civil
service reform had begun to professionalize the Revenue: appointment was by open competition [CIR, 1885, p. 100] but
formal exams were still some years away. Thus, by the 1870s the
Revenue had the organizational means, skills, and time to devote to asserting its technical authority over income tax. Its
technical practice could be characterized as resting on close
reading of the law and local officers worked under the sometimes “crushing nature” of supervision by central Inland Revenue officials [Riddell, 1887, pp. 109, 131]. In this specific arena
of government, as in a more general sense, administration was
becoming “too complicated to be left to part-time and unqualified squires” [Hobsbawm, 1969, p. 203].
In general, the forms of power employed by local Commissioners and Revenue officers complemented each other. However, they represented different modes of governance, effectively
in a competition for de facto control of the taxing process
[Lamb, 2001].13 Revenue techniques and procedures would not

13
Daunton [2001, Ch. 7] describes the administration of British taxation,
1842-1914, as dependent “on a hybrid system of lay and professional administrators” [p. 188]. His work describes the administrative system in its broader political and comparative context, but he presents the interaction between local Commissioners and Revenue officials as essentially co-operative. In this paper, we
consider the competitive aspects of such interaction somewhat more than
Daunton does.
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dominate practice until the local Commissioners relinquished de
facto control of the taxing process and the judiciary began to
reinforce standardized techniques of legal interpretation. The
shift of de facto regulatory power from the local Commissioners
to the Inland Revenue occurred gradually [Stebbings, 1994, p.
66]. Not until the 20th century was the Revenue recognized as
controlling local tax administration, leaving the Commissioners
to function as a judicial tribunal [Sabine, 1966, p. 155;
Stebbings, 1993].
Income Tax Practice — Recognition of Profits: Local tax authorities had the power to scrutinize and evaluate self-assessments of
profits and to make their own assessments in the absence of
adequate tax returns. Taxpayers’ concerns about the invasion of
their privacy by this process, especially when conducted in their
local community by neighbors, led politicians to legislate secrecy provisions for income tax, which were especially generous
in protecting the privacy of Schedule D Case I taxpayers; such
provisions helped maintain relatively high acceptance of the tax
and voluntary compliance [Stebbings, 1998; Daunton, 2001;
Lamb, 2001, p. 291]. Taxation of income by source amounted to
piecemeal taxation. Local tax authorities had an obligation to
assess the profits of businesses located in their jurisdiction, but
they had limited rights and occasions for enquiring into or reviewing a taxpayer’s total income. In consequence, tax authorities lacked knowledge of the taxpayer because they could not
calculate, nor require the taxpayer to calculate, total taxable income.
The problem was not that calculation per se was impossible
nor never done for income taxation, but that a totalizing calculation consistent with the concept of the taxpaying person was not
yet generally enforceable or verifiable [Lamb, 2001, p. 294].
Profits were particularly difficult for tax authorities to judge
because the outward signs of local profitability — or the lack
thereof — were unreliable or inadequate indicators of the taxable entity’s total business profits. During the course of the 19th
century, businesses generated profits from an increasingly complex and geographically expansive set of activities. Documentary
summaries became increasingly important for the calculation of
profits. Although the law included detailed provisions for the
calculation of profits, recognition of taxable profits was not a
simple matter of applying the law.
The words of income tax legislation suggest a calculative
regime that was well defined and precise, in which allowable
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deductions were carefully, and sparingly, specified. The suggestion is misleading for two reasons. First, tax law treated trading
profits as a precisely calculable part of total income, but nowhere was the term “profits” defined [Edwards, 1976; Freedman, 1987]. Legislation did not make clear if “profits” meant
“net profits” or “gross profits”, nor was the relationship, if any,
between taxable profits and profits for other purposes made
clear. In particular, tax legislation did not itemize which costs
were deductible in calculating profits. Second, taxpayers and
local tax officials ignored even those rules that were specific and
clear [e.g. SC 1861, qs. 2201-2208; Edwards, 1976, p. 303; Lamb,
1997a]. In practice, it was rare for a business to disclose more
than the amount of net profits for the relevant accounting period. If the taxpayer swore an oath that the amount was accurate, many General Commissioners felt bound to accept the
truthfulness of the statement [SC, 1861, q. 2199 (Welsh)].
The relative invisibility of profits and the vagueness of the
law made it difficult for honest taxpayers to know what amounts
to report on their returns. Till, Clerk to the Commissioners in
London, observed that “it is not every body who understands all
the Act; there is not one man in a hundred that reads the enormous paper that is sent round to him” [op. cit., q. 1962]. The
Revenue acknowledged that many taxpayers were unfamiliar
with the law [op. cit., qs. 2201, 2208 (Welsh)] and reminded its
Surveyors that the inadequacy of reported profits “may have
arisen either from the return being made upon an estimate instead of on figures taken from books showing the actual profits,
or from erroneous views as to deductions claimable, or from
some unintentional misstatement” [CIR, 1873, p. 35].
Despite the very detailed income tax law, practice was based
on estimation rather than precise calculation. The Revenue designed and distributed return forms to elicit written, examinable, and standardized knowledge of taxpayers. Many local tax
officials judged that getting an equitable approximation of what
was intended by Parliament was the more important, and the
only feasible, aim. Inland Revenue officials, however, were
trained to enforce the letter of the law. There was tension between the two bodies of tax officials, and Revenue officials frequently made clear their belief that income tax administration
as a whole could be improved if more authority was given to its
officers [Lamb, 1997b, pp. 238-258; Daunton, 2001, Ch. 7].
Income Tax Practice — Political Lobbying: By the mid-19th century, complaints about a broad range of tax problems were
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referred to Parliament and to the central tax authorities by individuals, as well as by organized groups. Many problems were
raised in Parliamentary debates of budget bills. Two Select
Committees were established to consider evidence and form an
opinion if income tax reform was desirable and feasible.14 The
Hume Committee was set up in 1851 to consider the possible
reform of income tax, but did not make firm proposals. However, its reports [SC, 1852a, 1852b] document the evidence of
lawyers, actuaries, political economists and one accountant. Evidence was presented on the nature of profits, especially the profits of mines, and the extent to which annuities combined a return of capital and income.
In 1861 the Hubbard Committee was given a similar brief,
but its more particular purpose was to consider a proposal by
the Chairman to tax profits after equitable deductions. Essentially, businessmen in some industries asserted that their commercial “clear profits” were different, and lower, than the profits
that were subject to income tax. Also, Schedule A businesses
perceived themselves to be taxed more heavily than Schedule D
trading concerns. Hubbard noted two defects of the current tax:
Industrial earnings are taxed to their full extent, although their dependence on the life and efficiency of
those whose labour is indispensable to their production
requires that a considerable portion be annually saved;
such portion, when invested as capital, being again
taxed on its subsequent products [and], capital, in the
course of realisation through the working of mines, is
taxed in the assessment of the entire value of their produce [SC, 1861, pp. x/xi-11].
Evidence was presented to demonstrate that mining companies
were permitted no allowance for the extraction of mining deposits. This was regarded as taxation of capital, rather than income.
Daniel Gooch, engineer to the Great Western Railway Company (GWR), gave evidence to the Select Committee [SC, 1861,
qs. 4083-4178]. GWR, which had its head office in London, had
interests in Welsh iron and coalmines, and used its railways to
convey mined products to markets elsewhere in Britain. Gooch
explained that GWR deducted income tax at source from the
royalties paid under mining leases. Both this tax and the tax on

14
See Daunton [2001, Ch. 4] for a discussion of the context for and issues
discussed by the Hume Committee [pp. 69 fn., 91-92] and the Hubbard Committee [pp. 93-94].
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the company’s own mining profits had to be paid over to the tax
authorities. Under Schedule A No. III rules, tax was payable on
the “whole value of the mineral . . . which generally includes the
royalty” [q. 4092]: in other words, the value of the annual produce of the mine with no deduction for working charges or
royalties paid.
Soon after it had commenced operating one North Wales
mine, GWR had made a return to local tax authorities of the
“earnings of the colliery, and the actual balance due to the proprietors of that colliery after paying the working charges.”
Gooch terms this “a mercantile balance, which we considered a
dividend amongst our shareholders” [q. 4093]. The local Commissioners refused to accept the deduction of working charges
and royalties. Gooch explained:
[C]laims such as those of the railway company for
freight and delivery, and of the corporation of London
for dues, must not be deducted from produce; but that
the company, as miners, under Schedule A., must pay
tax upon an estimate of the value at the pit’s mouth of
the coal raised, and not as traders, upon the actual produce, less expenses of conveyance and sale [q. 4094].
The method of calculation of taxable profits was one source
of GWR’s grievance, but the process of assessment presented
another. Gooch agreed with Hubbard that local officials “seem
to disregard any evidence you can produce in the way of your
own account keeping, and they levy the tax upon an arbitrary
system, and upon the principle of getting as much as they can”
[q. 4102]. He went on that they “actually repudiated altogether
our accounts, showing the actual sales, which were as clearly
and accurately kept as accounts can possibly be kept, and which
were open to them if they wished to go through them” [ibid.].
He noted further problems when GWR tried to appeal to authorities outside the Welsh locality. As Gooch explained:
[W]e wished to show our accounts rather to the [Special] Commissioners in London than to the local Commissioners, who were simply coal-owners as well as
ourselves, or were employed in working collieries; and
therefore we preferred exposing our affairs to the Commissioners in London; we were assured that that could
be done, but afterwards we found that it could not be
done [q. 4094].
If the GWR mining business had been treated as a trade assessable under Schedule D Case I, then there would have been no
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difficulty in making an appeal to the London Special Commissioners. This procedure would have avoided the unwelcome disclosure in the local tax office of the company’s financial affairs
to Welsh competitors.
As was the case with the Hume Committee, the Hubbard
Committee could agree no recommended action. Its report provides detailed reasons for the differences of opinion that split
the Committee. However, evidence before the Committee most
likely influenced one change in legislation [SC, 1861, qs. 4169,
4193]: in 1866 Schedule A No. III was “transferred” to Schedule
D [29 Vict., ch. 36, s. 8]. Our review of the depreciation cases
below reveals that it took 25 years to determine just what this
“transfer” meant.
Income Tax Practice — Appeals: Until 1874 taxpayers and local
Surveyors possessed rights to appeal against assessments only to
the local Commissioners themselves. The local process of assessment and appeal attempted to mediate disagreements and solve
problems. If, after an appeal, the taxpayer was dissatisfied, it
was not very clear what steps could be taken; the decisions of
local Commissioners were final and there was no formal direct
right of appeal to the courts. In some cases, taxpayers asked the
Treasury or Board of Inland Revenue to consider their cases;
such applications were usually refused [SC, 1861 (Pressly)]. In a
few instances, the Attorney-General took income tax cases, but
only if the subjects were fundamental to taxing practice.15
In 1874 a procedure for income tax cases to be stated for
consideration by the High Court or Court of Session was introduced. Thereafter, a taxpayer or Surveyor who was dissatisfied
with an appeal decision by the Commissioners could demand
that the matter be considered by the courts.16 Between 1874 and

15
This inference is clear if one considers the pre-1874 income tax precedents
referred to in the early income tax cases. See also Grout and Sabine [1976, p.
75].
16
The High Court of Justice had jurisdiction over such appeals in England
and Wales, while the Court of Session fulfilled equivalent judicial functions in
Scotland. The right to appeal to the Superior Court of Exchequer had existed for
Assessed Taxes, for which there was quite a large body of decided cases [Sabine,
1966, p. 105]. It is assumed that the change was part of the major reform of
courts under the Judicature Act of 1873. It involved uniting the jurisdictions of
the existing separate superior courts of law and equity (including the Exchequer); providing for “cheapness, simplicity and uniformity of procedure;” and
“the improvement of the constitution of the courts of appeal” [Manchester, 1980,
p. 148].
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1878 16 income tax cases were heard by the High Court or Court
of Session [CIR, 1878b, pp. liv-lvi]. Full reports of the judgments
were circulated to General Commissioners and to officials of the
Revenue. These 16 cases were a small fraction of the cases involving a dispute between taxpayers and tax officials.
In 1878, the possibility of further appeals to the Court of
Appeals and the House of Lords was introduced. [In Scotland,
the Inner House of the Court of Session acted equivalently to the
English Court of Appeal.] As with the 1874 change, the specific
reasons for the introduction of new appeal rights remain unclear [Stebbings, 1996, p. 616]. Only a very small number of tax
cases reached the Lords in the period 1878-1904 [Grout and
Sabine, 1976, pp. 77-79]. Appeal was most frequently initiated
by taxpayers, but the Crown had a higher percentage of successful cases [ibid.].
Appeals could proceed to the courts on matters of law, not
matters of fact. In a modern context, calculation is usually
treated as a matter of fact not law, but the distinction can be
difficult [McMahon and Weetman, 1997]. In the late 19th century, the tendency to treat calculation as a factual matter was
even less clear. When judging legal cases, British courts have a
long tradition of formalism. Literal interpretation was the norm,
but the “golden rule” of ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, was well established as a rule of interpretation by the
mid-19th century.17
THE DEPRECIATION CASES
As Daunton [2001, p. 19] argues in relation to 19th century
British taxation: “The definition of income itself was socially
constructed”. The courts — as arenas for the negotiation of
meanings by other actors and where judges were actors themselves — were important sites for the construction of meanings.
In the seven depreciation cases considered below, we can obtain
an understanding of how the meanings of “income” as distinct
from “capital,” as well as of “profits” and “depreciation,” were
contested and how authoritative meanings within particular
contexts emerged. These seven include all cases reported
17
Pollock, C. B.’s judgement in the case of Attorney-General v Hallett [1857]
2 H&N 368 at 375 established the precedent that “[t]he court will depart from a
literal interpretation where to keep to such an interpretation would lead to a
result which is so absurd that it cannot be supposed, in the absence of express
words which are wholly unambiguous, to have been contemplated” [Tiley and
Collison, 1999, pp. 17-18].
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between 1874 and 1878 [Addie, Forder, Knowles] where issues of
depreciation are considered in the context of a Schedule D or
Schedule A profit-making business [see Lamb, 1997b, Table
7.1].18 The fourth case [Coltness, 1879, 1881] is the first reported
case with similar content and context to be taken beyond the
High Court level. The remaining cases [Caledonian Railway,
Burnley Steamship, and Leith Steam Packet] are those reported
after the introduction of a new law in 1878 that purported to
settle the matter of depreciation, and that concerned the interpretation of similar content and context as in the earlier cases.
No 20th century cases have been included in the analysis below
because Coltness [1881] and Gresham [1892] provided authoritative meanings for the general taxing word “profits” and made
clear its relationship to other words — “capital” and “depreciation.” After the depreciation cases considered in this paper [see
Table 1], most changes in tax law were initiated by explicit new
legislation. Also, after 1900 income tax and the “fiscal constitution”, as Daunton [2001] puts it, went through a period of significant reform.
In the 1870s the income taxation of Schedule D and Schedule A businesses was contentious, but there was insufficient political will to make significant changes to its form or incidence
[Daunton, 2001, Ch. 6]. The evidence presented to the Select
Committees and the political propositions debated within them
reveal the heated reactions to the income tax despite the fact
that in 1875 rates were lower than they had been in any year
since the tax was introduced. At 2d. per pound (0.83%), the 1875
rate was trivial compared with levels reached in the 20th century; by 1879 the rate had more than doubled, but still stood at
only 5d. (2.08%); and in 1897 the rate was 8d. (3.33%) [Lamb,
1997b, Fig. 5.3]. Economic development and changing organizational forms for commercial and industrial enterprises meant
that Schedule D and Schedule A businesses were growing
sources of income tax [Lamb, 1997b, Ch. 6 and Fig. 6.1;
Daunton, 2001, Table 6.1]. These changes and the emerging distinctions between accounting and tax calculation, between practices in different parts of the UK, and between different types of
18
Full reports of these judgements were circulated to General Commissioners and to officials of the Revenue, and they were published in volume 1 of the
Tax Cases [TC] series. The rest of the 16 reported cases in the period concerned
other issues of “capital” vs. “revenue” expenditure [1]; the nature of profits and
allowable deductions [4]; the geographical scope of UK income tax [4]; procedure [2]; the nature of income [1]; and appropriate schedular categorisation [1].
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Court

Court of
Session Exchequer
- Scotland

High Court
- Exchequer
- England

High Court
- Exchequer
- England

Court of
Session Exchequer
- Scotland

Court of
Session Exchequer
- Scotland

Case
[Year decided]

Addie & Sons, Re
[1875]

Forder v. Andrew
Handyside and Co.,
Ltd. [1876]

Knowles (Andrew)
and Sons Limited v.
McAdam [1877]

Coltness Iron
Company v. Black
[1879]

Caledonian Railway
Company v. Banks
[1880]

Not allowed/
Schedule D Case I rules/

Not allowed
/Schedule D Case I rules/

Allowed on the basis that the claim was
necessary to calculate ‘profits’ and it was not
‘depreciation’ in the same sense as other cases
/Schedule D Case I rules/ [NB Overruled by
Coltness (1881) below]
Not allowed under precedent, as the 1878
statutory wear and tear allowance applied only
to plant and machinery
/Schedule D Case I rules/
Not allowed because this company had
maintained the value to the business of the
relevant assets by way of repair and renewal.
Wear and tear allowance or repair and renewals
were seen as alternatives. Only if the value to the
business was not maintained through repair and
renewal would the 1878 allowance be relevant
/Schedule D Case I rules/

• Allocation of original cost (less residual
amount) of mine buildings and plant over the
useful life of the mine (called ‘depreciation’)
• Allocation of the cost of pit sinking over the
useful life of the mine
• Depreciation of buildings, fixed plant and
machinery over the useful life of the works

• Allowance for amount shown as ‘depreciation’
in accounts, but used to show shareholders the
deterioration in the value of mines ‘by reason of
the coal gotten’
• Allowance for pit sinking in arriving at ‘profits’
• Wear and tear allowance under 1878 law for
structures
• Depreciation of rolling stock and machinery
claimed in addition to repairs and renewals

Iron
foundering/
Schedule D
Case I

Mining/
Schedule A
No. III

Mining/
Schedule A
No. III

Railway/
Schedule A
No. III

Outcome of claims/Tax rules used for
measurement

Mining/
Schedule A
No. III

Business/Tax Substance of depreciation claims
category
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Court of
Session Exchequer
- Scotland

Burnley Steamship
Co. v. Aikin [1894]

Court of
Session Exchequer
- Scotland

House of
Lords

Coltness Iron
Company v. Black
[1881]

Shipping/
Schedule D
Case I

Shipping/
Schedule D
Case I

Mining/
Schedule A
No. III

Although ships fell into the category of plant and
machinery, the part of the claim that exceeded
‘physical depreciation’ was’not allowed
/Schedule D Case I rules/
The higher claim was not allowed on the basis
that the Commissioners had made a ‘fair and
reasonable’ allowance on a matter of fact.
/Schedule D Case I rules/

• Taxpayer claimed a higher rate of wear and tear
allowance than had been allowed by the
General Commissioners
• The Commissioners accepted calculations
designed to create a fund that would permit the
owner ‘to keep up his plant and replace it when
it is worn out’

Not allowed because the law gave no allowance
for exhaustion of capital and overruled Knowles
(1877) above
/Schedule A No. III rules/

Outcome of claims/Tax rules used for
measurement

• Depreciation of ship due to obsolescence

• Restated claim emphasised systematic write off
over useful life of pit workings exhausted by
extraction of minerals from mines

Business/Tax Substance of depreciation claims
category
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Leith, Hull, and
Hamburg Steam
Packet Co. v. Bain
[1897]

Court

Case
[Year decided]
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businesses created tensions within the taxing system and competing claims for how to interpret the taxing words. Through
examination of the tax depreciation cases, we can see how some
of these tensions were relieved and how meanings were constructed.
THE FIRST THREE CASES, 1874-1878
The variety of tax practice meant that there were real differences of interpretation of taxing words to resolve. The judgments in these three cases make clear that “depreciation” could
not be deducted as an expense “expressly enumerated” in the
taxing act, but it might be deductible if it fell to be treated as an
essential component of the calculation of the “profits” of the
enterprise. The cases confirmed, to an extent, the Revenue’s
view that income tax law modified the concept of “profits” used
for other commercial and legal purposes.
Re Addie & Sons [1875]: The first income tax case was heard in
the Court of Session in Scotland and was brought under the new
appeal procedures. It concerned the depreciation provided by an
ironstone mining concern and revealed the characteristic arguments of both parties to the appeal — the taxpayer and the
Surveyor — and the judges. Addie also reveals the application of
tax rules following the 1866 “transfer” of the Schedule A trading
concerns to Schedule D: Addie was assessed under the rules of
Schedule D Case I [see Figure 1], and expenditure on its property was classed as disallowable capital.
Addie & Sons, Coal and Iron Masters, appealed against an
1874 decision of the General Commissioners in Lanark. The
firm had calculated its taxable profits after deducting “a percentage . . . for pit sinking and for depreciation of buildings and
machinery”: “[T]hey contended that the share of the gross annual receipts corresponding to the proportion of the cost of
sinking the pits [appertaining] to the current year . . . was in no
sense a profit, and that, therefore, it ought to be deducted from
the gross annual receipts in arriving at the assessable profit” [p.
2]. Equally, they contended, the difference between the original
cost of pit buildings and machinery and the “price or value
obtainable” when the pits were exhausted “is in no sense a
profit, and that consequently in arriving at the profits upon
which they are assessable there ought to be deducted from the
gross receipts of each year a sum corresponding to the share of
that difference [appertaining] to such year” [ibid.]. “In no sense
Published by eGrove, 2002
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a profit” was a phrase used regularly by taxpayers in this and
subsequent cases.
In the original appeal the Surveyor had argued that neither
deduction was acceptable because (1) “the Income Tax is an
annual tax existing for one year only” and (2) “it is not lawful . . .
to make any deductions except such as are expressly enumerated” [ibid.]. As the deductions claimed were “not enumerated
in the Acts”, the Surveyor argued, using the words of the tax
legislation, that they were “expressly forbidden” [p. 3].19
The Scottish court dismissed the appeal because the deductions were claims for capital expenditure:
[T]he machinery and building connected with a pit appear to me to be just part of the pit itself. It is one
compound structure, necessary for the working of the
mine, and the question comes to be . . . [are] they entitled to deduct something on account of . . . an expenditure of capital. It is an investment of money, of capital, and must be placed to capital account in any
properly kept books applicable to such a concern [p. 3].
The reference to “one compound structure” emphasizes the nature of the pit as capital or “property”. The Lord President of the
First Division then disallowed the expenditure: “[a]s soon as you
ascertain that this is an expenditure of additional capital, there
is an end to any proposal to deduct anything in respect of it” [p.
4]. In the absence of any specific legislative provision to the
contrary, the fact that there was an “expenditure on additional
capital” determined that there would be no income tax deduction calculated by reference to that expenditure, at the time of
the expenditure or in the future. The court appears to have believed that once expenditure was made on capital account, there
it should remain.
Forder v. Andrew Handyside and Company, Limited [1876]: The
first English depreciation case to reach the High Court reveals

19
“. . . [I]n the Computation [of income tax, whether done by the taxpayer or
the tax official], it shall not be lawful to make any other Deductions therefrom
than such as are expressly enumerated in this Act; nor to make any Deduction on
account of any annual Interest, Annuity, or other annual Payment, to be paid to
any Person out of any Profits or Gains chargeable by this Act; . . . nor to make
any Deduction from Profits . . . on account of Diminution of Capital employed or
of Loss sustained in any Trade, Manufacture, Adventure, or Concern . . . .” [5 & 6
Vict., ch. 35. sect. 159, italics added].
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the contrast between the commercial attitudes of the Commissioners and the Surveyor’s insistence on looking no further than
legal words for meaning. The court’s judgment makes clear the
principle that there is no equity in a taxing statute, despite the
judges’ evident sympathy with the arguments of the taxpayer.
The description “depreciation” in Handyside’s accounts was
enough to taint the expense as “capital” and bring it within the
disallowances of Schedule D Case I.
Handyside, a firm of iron-founders, was assessed in 1874/75
to £8,642 “the amount taken from their own report, and therein
specified at nett profits” [p. 65]. “Their own report” was a “balance sheet for the year ended on 31st July 1874, being their first
year of trading” [ibid.]. The Surveyor appealed against an 1875
decision of the General Commissioners, which confirmed the
assessment, on the basis that it permitted Handyside to deduct
depreciation of buildings, fixed plant, and machinery in calculating its “nett profits.” The Surveyor argued that depreciation
was a deduction in respect of capital and therefore, disallowable. Further, as depreciation was not an expense expressly enumerated by the act, he argued, it was not allowed. He went on to
say that repairs would have been allowed if Handyside had
claimed them instead.
Handyside contended that it would be wrong to tax them on
an amount equivalent to the depreciation charge: “inasmuch as
such sum had no real existence, but was written off in the accounts in accordance with the articles of association, as the
works must of necessity depreciate from year to year, and as the
sum expended in repairs could not entirely replace such depreciation” [pp. 65-66]. The General Commissioners agreed with
the taxpayer. In the case stated for the High Court, it was noted
that: “[t]he majority of the Commissioners . . . being of [the]
opinion that persons in trade were equitably entitled to write off
from their profits each year a sum of depreciation, and that the
amount claimed was fair and reasonable, decided in favour of
the company” [p. 66; italics added].
In the High Court, the Chief Baron of Exchequer, unlike the
General Commissioners, found no room for equity in the taxing
act: “Whatever we may think of the justice and fairness as regards commercial or manufacturing interests . . . it is perfectly
clear that . . . as regards Schedule D., the . . . traders, are not
entitled to this deduction [for depreciation]. . . . The Act is quite
explicit, and can admit of no doubtful or difficult construction
. . .” [pp. 66-67]. His colleague Pollock, B. concurred [pp. 68-69].
Although the matter of the income tax deduction was settled as
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far as he was concerned, he went on to consider the nature of
depreciation:
It appears that by the articles of association . . . that a
reserve fund is to be formed, and before recommending
a dividend, and of course therefore before paying a dividend, the company, perhaps, very prudently and properly, agree to set aside a sum from the nett profits of the
company, and bear in mind that . . . they are nett profits
before . . . being . . . set . . . aside, and this is merely the
mode in which they think fit to apply a portion of . . .
their nett profits . . . as a reserve fund for the purpose
of . . .” meeting contingencies, or of purchasing, improving, . . . restoring, . . . or maintaining the . . . property of the company, or for equalizing dividends [pp.
66-67].
Although Pollock, B. noted that repairs would be an allowable
deduction, he expressed his concern that the reserve fund, to
which depreciation had been transferred under Handyside’s articles of association, covered a number of purposes and he could
not determine which it was in the particular case. He distrusted
the description “depreciation” and believed it to be indeterminate. “[T]he question remains whether the Respondents are entitled to deduct this entire sum of [the depreciation charge],
which may be applied anywhere or at any time they please for a
great variety of purposes which are actually forbidden, directly
as well as indirectly, by [the income tax law]” [p. 68].
Pollock, B. also tried to sort out the depreciation accounting:
Now there are three modes to which this fund to meet
the depreciation of machinery may be dealt with — one
is by adding to the company’s original capital what is
called a depreciation fund; the second is by laying aside
out of the annual profits which would be otherwise divisible among the shareholders a certain sum to meet
the estimated depreciation; and the third is by waiting
until the depreciation occurs, and then either repairing
or reinstating the machinery so as to make it of equal
value and efficiency to what it before was [p. 69].
Huddleston, B. added his comments on the accounting:
[The amount of the depreciation change] is a sum
which a prudent person . . . would put by or lay aside
for . . . meeting what might be called the expenses of
renewal. The articles of association clearly contemplate
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that it should be carried into the capital account as a
reserve fund. The articles . . . contemplate that the company might make use of this money, but if they did it
would be in the capital account . . . and it is quite clear
that it would be treated for all purposes of book-keeping and for all usual purposes as capital. The Scotch
case [Re Addie & Sons] . . . clearly includes that view [p.
70].
Kelly, C.B. addressed the problem of lack of precise information. Normally, a company would be allowed a deduction for
repairs based on the average of three years. Handyside was to be
taxed in respect of its first year of trading. Kelly, C.B. expressed
the view that in such circumstances “you must get the best information that you can, and must judge from what has been
done during that one year what will be the probable amount
expended in the ensuing year” [p. 68].
The Forder case confirmed for the English courts that depreciation was a disallowable deduction in arriving at taxable
profit because it related to capital expenditure. The case was
notable for the judges’ attempts to understand what depreciation meant in a particular business and in its accounts. Also, it
articulated for income tax the court’s opinion that there is no
room for equity in the interpretation of the law; interpretation is
of the words that are written in the legislation. Such judicial
views about interpretation were used by the tax authorities as
the basis for authoritative interpretations and instructions to
local officials and officers, which in turn buttressed the growing
disciplinary power of the central taxing authorities.
Knowles and Sons Limited v McAdam [1877]: The third depreciation case was heard by the English High Court in January 1877.
It illustrates the willingness of the court to be persuaded by
commercial arguments, provided the traps of legal meanings
established through case precedent could be avoided. From earlier cases, “depreciation” had acquired a meaning linked to
“capital,” which was disallowable under certain express words
of the Act. In this case, the courts preferred a commercial calculation of “profits” to the idea of “profits” as an abstraction distinct from other types of profits.
The company, which traded as proprietors of freehold and
leasehold coal mines, appealed against an 1875 decision of the
Special Commissioners that disallowed the company’s claim for
depreciation on the grounds that it was a deduction in respect of
capital expenditure. At the appeal hearing before the Special
Published by eGrove, 2002

31

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 29 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
136

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2002

Commissioners, the company was represented by one of its directors, David Chadwick MP. In the case stated for the High
Court, it had been noted that:
. . . Mr. Chadwick [urged the Commissioners] that a
sum of 10,424l. 15s. 3d. should be deducted on the
ground that in estimating the amount of assessable
profits the Commissioners ought to allow as a deduction that sum which was claimed by the [Company] as
“depreciation,” and which, as stated in the annual report for the year ending 31st December 1874, “is based
on a calculation of the extent of coal available and the
duration of existing leases, but it may be modified as
future circumstances require;” and he further explained
that the term “depreciation” in the balance sheet was
used to show to the shareholders the deterioration or
difference in value of their property at the end of the
year and after the working out of a year’s coal and the
expiration of a year of their leases, as compared with
the value of such property at the beginning of the year;
in other words, that a re-valuation of the property
showed that it was worth, at the end of the first year,
10,424l. 15s. 3d. less than at the time of the purchase 12
months before [pp. 161-162].
In presenting the company’s case to the Barons of Exchequer, counsel contended that 10,424l. 15s. 3d. “fairly represented
the diminution in [the value of the coal mines], by reason of the
coal gotten . . . , and which sum, for the purposes of such balance sheet, was technically, but perhaps incorrectly, referred to
as depreciation” [p. 163]. Counsel argued that “capital withdrawn [which was disallowed under the act] is a different thing
to capital used up” [p. 164]. He went on to describe how taxable
profit must be recognized:
The first element to be determined is the full amount of
the profits or gains. . . . You must, before you arrive at
the profits at all, not merely be able out of your receipts
to pay your expenses, but to replace your exhausted
capital; before that is done profit does not begin. There
is no difference in principle between the case of a
colliery proprietor with a stock of coal under ground
and a coal merchant with his stock above ground. . . .
[T]herefore so much of the receipts as represents the
diminution in the value of the mine by the exhaustion
of the coal is not profit at all in any true sense of the
word [pp. 164-165].
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Pollock, B. intervened at that point to say “You cannot take
the word profit alone” and counsel replied:
I should deny that it was gain from this particular
adventure, trade, or concern; it is only your property
converted into another form. Would not the Court of
Chancery interfere if the company were going to pay a
dividend when, though it had made a sum of money, it
had exhausted an amount of coal more than representing that sum of money? Would not the Court of Chancery stop the payment of the dividend because there
had been no profit? . . . In no proper sense of the word
can you say that a man has made a profit when he has
only that in another shape which he had before,
namely, money instead of coal [p. 165].
The company’s argument rested, therefore, on the fact that exhaustion of its capital in the form of coal stocks would be taken
into account when calculating normal commercial profit, as evidenced by the analogy to a trading concern and by reference to
profits that would be available for the payment of dividends.
The Attorney-General (Sir John Holker) presented the Revenue’s case. He started with the familiar argument that the income tax was temporary “and a man has to pay on the amounts
of profits which he may realise in any particular year” [p. 164].
He then presented “income” and “capital” as abstractions that
must be kept away from each other in order to work: “[t]he idea
of capital is kept separate from income, and it is upon the income that he has to pay” [ibid.]. He acknowledged that “[t]he
argument of the other side [of diminution in value] may be
right, upon the principles recognized in political economy; but
the very aim and object of the Income Tax Acts seem to have
been to prevent the principles which a political economist would
apply from applying to cases under those Acts” [ibid.]. His colleague, Albert Venn Dicey, added that given that “the Act [was]
only yearly, it would be extremely difficult [to treat Schedule D.
businesses as a political economist would]” [p. 166]. The basis
of the Revenue’s case was, therefore, that taxable profits could
not be the same as those profits calculated for other commercial
purposes or as calculated by an economist. The Crown representatives argued that their interpretation was the same as what
“the very aim and object of the Income Tax Acts seem to have
been” [p. 164, italics added].
Dicey introduced an argument that suggests that the 1866
“transfer” of Schedule A No. III businesses to Schedule D was
not as complete as the judges in Addie and Forder had treated it.
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He argued that the issue was not a calculation of “profits” under
Schedule D, but a calculation of “annual value” under Schedule
A [see Figure 2]. He presented the Revenue’s view that the
taxable income of concerns, such as mining, that had been
transferred “for purposes of convenience of assessments” from
Schedule A to Schedule D continued to be calculated according
to the rules of Schedule A. Notwithstanding this point, he argued that the expense would be disallowed as a “withdrawal of
capital” even under Schedule D rules.
Kelly, C.B. delivered the court’s judgment in favor of the
company: “looking to the nature of the Income Tax Act, and
looking to the plain and simple, but clear and undoubted meaning of the word “profits,” I do not think this case admits the
smallest doubt” [p. 166]. He dismissed the Revenue’s claim that
Schedule A rules continued to apply by reference to the “comprehensible expression” that such a mining case was “transferred” from Schedule A to Schedule D [ibid.]. His colleague
Pollock, B. could see no “inconsistency between Schedule A and
those rules [of Schedule D]” [p. 175].
Kelly, C.B. distinguished Knowles from Forder on the basis
that the exhaustion of the coal stocks was deductible in arriving
at net profits and that there was no express provision in Schedule D that disallowed such expenditure. In other words, he accepted the company’s contention that it was not really depreciation and that coal mining is a trade no different in essence from
that of a coal merchant. The exhaustion of coal was not a “withdrawal of capital” because it was not a sum taken out of the
business and applied for another purpose; it was not a “sum
employed or intended to be employed as capital in such trade”
because it was not something “additional to the capital which
has been actually employed in realising the profit that has been
acquired during the year;” and it was not “a diminution of capital” because it is a “purchase of an article which afterwards you
sell at a profit” [p. 172].
Kelly, C.B. argued that the case of a mining lease for a
single year was essentially the same as a lease for a multiple of
years to the businessman. “His profit is that which remains to
him and which he can put into his pocket and spend, if he has
not already spent it, as part or the whole of his year’s expenditure” [p. 169]. If he were considering a mining lease for one
year, the judge made clear that “profit” would equal the difference between revenue from the sale of coal in the market and
the sum of amounts paid for the mining lease, labor, and machinery.
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FIGURE 2
Rules for the Calculation of Schedule A No. III Profits
Taxation of Annual Value
“The annual value of all the properties [of Schedule A, No. III] shall be
understood to be the full Amount for One Year, or the Average Amount for
One Year, of the Profits received therefrom within the respective Times herein
limited.” . . .
1st “Of Quarries . . . , on the Amount of Profits in the preceding Year:”
2nd “Of Mines of Coal, . . . Iron, and other Mines, on an Average of the Five
preceding Years, subject to the Provisions concerning Mines contained in
this Act:”
3rd “Of Iron Works, Gas Works, . . . Waterworks, . . . Docks, . . . Railways,
and other Ways, . . . and other Concerns of the like Nature, from or
arising out of any Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, or Heritages, on
the Profits of the Year preceding:”
“The duty . . . [shall] be charged on the Person, . . . whether Corporate or not
Corporate, carrying on the Concern, . . . on the amount of the Produce or
Value thereof, and before paying, rendering, or distributing the produce or the
value either between the different Persons or Members of the Corporation,
Company, or Society engaged in the Concern, or to the owner of the Soil or
Property, or to any Creditor or other Person whatever having a Claim on or
out of the said Profits ; and all such Persons . . . shall allow out of such
Produce or Value a proportionate Deduction of the Duty so charged, and the
said Charge shall be made on the said Profits exclusively of any Lands used
or occupied in or about the Concern”.
Deduction of Tax at Source on Distributions of
Profit in the Form of Annual Charges
“. . . [U]pon all Annuities, yearly Interest of Money, or other annual Payments, . . . there shall be charged for every Twenty Shillings of the annual
Amount thereof the Sum of Sevenpence, without Deduction, according to
and under and subject to the Provisions by which the Duty in the Third Case
of Schedule (D.) may be charged; provided that in every Case where the same
shall be payable out of Profits or Gains brought into charge by virtue of this
Act, no Assessment shall be made upon the [recipient of] such Annuity, Interest, or other annual Payment, but the whole of such Profits or Gains shall be
charged with Duty on the Person liable to such annual Payment without distinguishing such annual Payment, [who] shall be authorised to deduct [tax] out
of such annual Payment . . . , and the Person to whom such Payment liable to
Deduction is to be made shall allow such Deduction. . . . ”
Charge and Assessment under Schedule D Rules
“The . . . concerns described in No. III. Schedule (A.) of [5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35,
sect. 60] shall be charged and assessed to the Duties hereby granted in the
manner in the said No. III. mentioned according to the Rules prescribed by
Schedule (D.) of the said Act, so far as such Rules are consistent with the said
No. III, . . . . ”
Source: 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 35. sect. 60 and sect. 102; 29 & 30 Vict., ch. 36, sect. 8;
italics added.
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Cleasby, B. concurred but was careful to state that he did
not wish “to generalise so as to appear to include different
cases.” He was persuaded by counsel for the company because
“how can you get at the balance of the profits of trade without
stock-taking?” He noted that the case turned on whether or not
any provision of Schedule D Case I, 3rd Rule applied:
No doubt there are some of these rules which are inconsistent with economics. No doubt there is some reason why in dealing with the Income Tax it was thought
that it should not go by the ordinary rules. . . . But I can
find nothing in Rule 3 to call upon us in this case not to
have [a] stock-taking . . . for the purpose of arriving at
the balance of profits. . . . The proper description of it is
“capital consumed in making the profits.” There is not
the idea of capital withdrawn . . . in it [p. 174].
He went on to make clear that he did not see the circumstances
of Knowles as at all similar to those of Forder. Exhaustion of
coal stocks was not “depreciation”, which was money “put by.”
“[Y]ou cannot put by a sum of money for the purpose of meeting depreciation. All you are allowed to do is to deduct your own
repairs and things of that sort which belong to the year. . . . It
seems . . . obvious that if you do more than that you depart from
the principle of the Income Tax Act, which forbids it” [ibid.].
Pollock, B. pointed out the confusion attributable to language: “the case seems to me really to have arisen, from a sort of
misapprehension which often unfortunately arises, not only in
matters of law, but still more perhaps, in matters of commercial
accounts, by the nomenclature which is used” [p. 175]. He referred to the fact that the company had used the phrase “depreciation” in its first accounts and concludes that the Commissioners failed to apprehend the true facts of the case as a result:
That seems to have landed the Commissioners in the
idea that that was necessarily in diminution of the sum
of the balance of profits or gains. When they get before
the Commissioners, Mr. Chadwick, who thoroughly understands this matter, explains . . . that “. . . depreciation . . . is based on a calculation of the extent of coal
available, and the duration of existing leases . . .” and he
further explained that the term depreciation “in the balance sheet was used to show to the shareholders the
deterioration or difference in the value of their property
. . . after the working out of a year’s coal. . . .” That was
explained by [their counsel] as meaning that . . . they
had overworked the proportion of the whole quantity of
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coal as compared with the whole number of years
[ibid.].
Pollock, B. then likened depreciation in this context to rent,
calculated partly by reference to annual rent payable and to an
apportionment of the lease premium payable in respect of a
number of years. He went on:
I do not think that there can be any doubt that when
these facts are apprehended, and when we ask ourselves
what is the profit or gain of this adventure, we must
consider that term [depreciation] and estimate it, and
therefore deduct it from the gross receipts of the sale of
the coal before we can arrive at the balance of profits or
gains. . . . [I]f [the case] had been done originally [as it
was presented to the High Court], it would have never
come to us at all [pp. 175-176].
Consequences of First Three Depreciation Cases: Agitation and
Legislative Change: The first three judgments were based on literal interpretation of statutory words, but certain words remained difficult to interpret. Schedule D taxed “the balance of
profits and gain.” If the place to start was “profits,” then how
did express provisions of the act adjust this sum? Expenditure
on “capital” was not permitted to be deducted, but what was
“capital”? “Depreciation” was sometimes a deduction of capital;
on other occasions “depreciation” arose from a revaluation of
capital, but was not capital itself.
The first two judgments suggest that the courts saw “depreciation” as a provision for depreciation, rather than an accrual
itself of the consumption of capital over time. Depreciation
could be realized only at some future point in time when a loss
in value occurred in a market transaction or repairs were incurred to restore use-values. How was disallowable depreciation
for a part of the compound capital of a mine [Addie] different
from allowable exhaustion of coal stocks in the third case,
Knowles? The English High Court did not need to resolve that
dilemma because Addie was Scottish precedent and the Barons
of Exchequer had convinced themselves that “depreciation” was
something entirely different from the exhaustion of coal through
mining.
In the same year as Knowles, 1877, the absence of a statutory industrial depreciation allowance was the focus of agitation for change. Agitation took the form of direct lobbying of
the Treasury, Inland Revenue, and Parliament. The introduction
to this paper outlined the efforts by Chambers of Commerce
and politicians such as David Chadwick aimed to introduce a
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depreciation allowance in the 1877 and 1878 budget bills. This
problem came up in other contexts, too. The Companies Act
Select Committee, 1877 heard testimony concerning the statutory disincentive in the income tax act to the provision of depreciation [Bryer, 1993, p. 675]. Chadwick was a member of the
Committee and co-author of the Companies Acts Amendment
(No. 2) Bill to reform company accounts presentation. He proposed to omit any requirement to show depreciation in the balance sheet or profit and loss account “. . . because to enforce the
putting of it in is to enforce the payment under the present state
of the law of the amount for income tax on the depreciation”
[SC, 1877, qs. 744, 1306-1308]. Because of the tax treatment,
Chadwick preferred revaluation to depreciation as a way of arriving “at the value of the properties forming part of the assets
of the company” [q. 1980].20
Bryer [1993, p. 675] interprets Chadwick’s comments to
mean: “Prior to 1878 there was a strong tax disincentive against
charging depreciation on wear and tear because it was only
deductible for taxation if based on losses in “value” ”. The situation was not this clear-cut. Based on the High Court and Court
of Session depreciation cases, it would have followed that no
taxpayer who referred explicitly to “depreciation” would obtain
tax relief. However, adjustments for losses in value (i.e. “depreciation” in the Knowles accounts) made in arriving at net profits had obtained relief. Bryer’s analysis would have been more
accurate if he had said, “there was a strong tax disincentive
against saying you were charging depreciation”. Along similar
lines, Edwards [1976, pp. 306-307] suggests that one way taxpayers obtained relief for capital expenditure was “losing” items
in the accounts. Bryer [1993, p. 676] concludes “that systematic
depreciation was usually charged, . . . even if . . . it was not always published”.
In 1878 Parliament agreed to introduce a “wear and tear”
allowance to the law. There was some optimism that the 1878
law would deal with the inequitable absence of a depreciation
allowance for income tax purposes. The new law stated:
20
Chadwick’s testimony to the Select Committee may help explain some of
the accounting policies of his other companies. Baldwin and Berry [1999] consider the capital accounting practices in three Chadwick coal and iron companies. In the accounts of all three they observe “a considerable reduction in the
published information provided” in connection with depreciation from about
1870: “Depreciation was no longer mentioned in either balance sheet or directors’ report, nor did the balance sheet identify separately additions and disposals
of fixed assets, as had been past practice” [p. 86].
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Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in any Act relating to Income Tax, the [tax
authorities] shall, in assessing the profits or gains of
any trade, manufacture, adventure, or concern in the
nature of trade . . . allow such deduction as they may
think just and reasonable as representing the diminished value by reason of wear and tear during the year
of any machinery or plant used for the purposes of the
concern . . . [41 Vict. ch. 15. s. 12].
As subsequent cases make clear, taxpayers did not understand
how narrowly the Revenue and the courts would interpret the
phrases “any trade” and “any machinery or plant used for the
purposes of the concern”.
CASES AFTER THE STATUTORY
DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE, 1878
The Significance of Schedule A No. III: For the Revenue, A. V.
Dicey argued in Knowles that the 1866 transfer of Schedule A
No. III businesses to Schedule D only applied to matters of
procedure and was intended to give those businesses the same
degree of privacy as Schedule D Case I taxpayers enjoyed. In
Knowles, the judges did not accept his argument; in Coltness,
they did. Dicey [1835-1922] was an eminent legal scholar,21 and
the line of his reasoning left its mark on income tax law and
practice. In Coltness and later cases, judicial interpretation
turned to older calculative principles associated with property
taxes to deal with Schedule A No. III businesses. Through historical interpretation, the court abstracted the meanings of taxing words away from their contemporary commercial context.
In doing so, the court made clear that neither “depreciation” nor
“valuation adjustments” to reflect the consumption of capital
had a place in the calculation of taxable profits of a mining
company.
21
Dicey served as Inland Revenue counsel from 1876-90. At the time, he was
already a prominent legal scholar and public commentator on matters of law
and government [Ford, 1985]. From 1882 he was Vinerian Professor of English
Law at Oxford. Daunton [2001, p. 202] notes that he was “a leading opponent of
‘collectivism’ . . . [and] hostile to ‘officialism,’ arguing that lawyers should not
become means to an administrative end of applying complicated statutes.”
Daunton goes on to associate Dicey with the “strong professional ideology” of
lawyers “as defenders of individual rights, linked with an ad hoc approach and
resistance to general principles, which gave considerable significance to informal understandings between the revenue authorities, accountants and lawyers”
[ibid.].
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Coltness Iron Company v. Black [1879-1881]: This Scottish case
was the first depreciation case to be heard by the courts after
the law changed to permit appeal to the House of Lords and
after the inclusion of the wear and tear allowance in the income
tax law. Coltness, a large coal mining and iron-mastering business, appealed against an 1878 decision by General Commissioners that denied a £9,027 deduction for the cost of pit sinking. Before the Commissioners, the company claimed that
“whatever might have been the interpretation of the law prior to
[the 1878 change to permit the wear and tear allowance], they
were entitled, under [that law] to the deduction they claimed”
[p. 288]. The company cited the English case [Knowles] to support its claim that “sinking the pits was expenditure in winning
the minerals” and argued that in the cost of “wages expended in
sinking, there is nothing . . . to represent capital, and the money
so expended cannot be an investment, because it can never be
recovered” [ibid.]. The Surveyor of Taxes contended that the
wear and tear allowance only applied to plant and machinery
and earlier case law [Addie] had established that the expense of
pit sinking was a disallowable “charge upon capital”.
After the Court of Session affirmed the decision of the Commissioners, the Company appealed again. In presenting its case
for consideration by the House of Lords, new evidence was introduced, including detailed schedules of pit sinking costs, pits
exhausted over a long period, and a derivation of the £9,027
claimed. The revised information clarified that the amount
claimed:
. . . does not represent the cost of pit-sinking during the
year, but is a sum . . . estimated [to] properly represent
the amount of capital expended on making bores and
sinking pits which has been exhausted by the year’s
working. . . . The working charges deducted and allowed in ascertaining the profits for assessment include
the whole cost of getting and raising the minerals, after
the pits are sunk, and of manufacturing the metal and
selling the iron and coal, and the general expenses of
the concern [pp. 295-296].
The revised case emphasized the company’s claim that the
deduction was for capital exhausted during the year in question.
The case was reconsidered by the Court of Session, but it affirmed its earlier decision. In the course of his judgment, the
Lord President made clear that there was a difference between
the calculation of profits for tax purposes and “the amount of
the net profits of the year which would appear in the ordinary
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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annual balance sheet of a trading company” [p. 307]. When ascertaining net profits for the purpose of paying dividends, “the
state of the capital account necessarily affects the balance sheet”
[p. 308]. However:
. . . the [tax] statute refuses to take an ordinary balance
sheet, or the net profits thereby ascertained, as the measure of the assessment, and requires the full balance of
profits, without allowing any deduction except for
working expenses, and without regard to the state of
the capital account or to the amount of capital employed in the concern, or sunk and exhausted, or withdrawn. Any other construction of the statute would . . .
be inconsistent with the leading principle on which it is
based and with its express words. . . . [T]he statute is
not concerned with the failure or success of his speculation, and looks only to what is the income derived from
the business year by year [ibid.; italics added].
The statutory phrase “the full Amount” [see Figure 2] was interpreted to modify “profits”. “The full balance of profits” emphasized that “profits” in taxation had a nature different from other
forms of “profits”.
The House of Lords heard the case in 1881 and affirmed the
decision of the lower court that no tax allowance was available
for the exhaustion of capital. In doing so, the Lords reviewed the
English High Court decision in Knowles and overruled it. The
Lords also sought to interpret the relevant legislation of Schedule A and Schedule D in its historical context and, in so doing,
presented a persuasive explanation for the divergence of taxable
profit measurement from commercial accounting profits. This
analysis was significant for the development of judicial doctrines of “capital” versus “income” in taxation.
The Lords confirmed the lower court’s view that net profits
for tax purposes were not net profits as disclosed in a set of
accounts presented to shareholders. This was a contradiction of
the decision in Knowles, in which the High Court interpreted the
phrase “balance of profits or gain” to mean normal commercial
profits adjusted only if any of the matters “expressly enumerated” applied in the particular case. Earl Cairns said:
It may be proper for a . . . trading concern to perform in
. . . their books an operation [to deduct mine depreciation] every year in order to judge of the sum that can in
that year be safely taken out of the trade . . . but I am
clearly of the opinion that the owner of a mine cannot
. . . thus manipulate his accounts when the question is
Published by eGrove, 2002
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. . . what is the amount of [taxable] profits received
from the mine [p. 312].
Lord Blackburn further distinguished taxable profits from the
profits that would be calculated by a political economist. He
quoted a passage from “McCulloch on Political Economy”:22
Profit must not be confounded with the produce of industry primarily received by the capitalist. They really
consist of the produce on its value remaining to those
who employ their capital in an Industrial undertaking
after all their necessary payments have been deducted,
and after the capital wasted and used in the undertaking has been replaced. If the produce derived from an
undertaking after defraying the necessary outlay . . . is
merely sufficient to replace the capital exhausted, there
is no surplus, there is no loss, but there is no annual
profit [quoted at pp. 315-316, italics added].
Lord Blackburn went on to say: “I do not feel at all inclined to
dispute the sufficiency of this definition . . . [b]ut that is certainly not the scheme of the income tax” [p. 316].
Lords Penzance and Blackburn took the argument further
and made clear, unlike the Barons of Exchequer in the Knowles
case, that they found legal significance in the fact that mining
concerns were strictly subject to tax under Schedule A, No. III
rather than Schedule D.23 The analogy in Knowles to trade in
cotton or tea had not “elucidated but rather confused” the analysis of the case [p. 314]. Therefore, the Lords supported an argument that had been made by the Surveyors in these cases that
the transfer to Schedule D only applied to the process of assessment.
After noting that in “a strict and logical sense” the “actual
profit obtained by the Company out of the entire adventure”
would be calculated by reference to the “prime cost of the mineral bed”, Lord Penzance stated that he did not think that this
was the sense in which the word “profit” was used in the income
tax act: “[t]he intention of the Act, it is abundantly clear, was
in Schedule A to tax property” [p. 313]. As far as a mine was
22
See Daunton [2001, Ch. 6] for a discussion of the leading role played by
economists, including McCulloch, in debates over tax policy and practice, and
for introducing relevant language and concepts to political debate and public
discourse. Counsel for the ordinary shareholder attempted, with no apparent
positive effect, to use this passage from McCulloch to support his contentions
about the proper meaning of “profits” in Lee v Neuchatel [1888/89] at p. 12.
23
Earl Cairns, on the other hand, was of the view that “the thing to be
assessed” was the same whether under Schedule D or Schedule A [p. 313].
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concerned, “[t]he only question is how shall the annual value of
this species of property be ascertained” [ibid.]:
The words “profit received therefrom” are here introduced to define the annual value of the thing which is
to be taxed, which is the “mine,” and it could not I
think be intended that for the purpose of calculating
“the annual value” of a “mine,” the original cost of the
“mine” itself, or any part of it should be first deducted.
. . . [T]he words “profits received therefrom” . . . mean
. . . the entire profits derived from the “mine,” deducting the cost of working it, but not deducting the cost of
making it [p. 314].
“Property” was the “thing” to be identified, because it gives rise
to the taxable income, the “annual value”. This case reminds us
that the original income tax was charged by virtue of the Property and Income Tax Act [39 Geo. 3. ch. 13], and subsequent acts
retained references to “property” along with “income” as objects
of the tax.
Lord Penzance distinguished the case of a Schedule D
trader from that of a Schedule A mine-owner:
For the . . . trader is taxed . . . not in respect of any
“property” which he possesses and of which he enjoys
the fruits, but only upon the profits which he realises
annually in his trade, whereas the owner of a “mine” is
taxed in respect of that “mine” as a fixed and realized
“property,” which belongs to him and from which he
reaps an annual benefit; and the words “annual value”
or “profit received” from that “property” are introduced
into the Statute, not as the subject of taxation, but only
as the measure of the taxation to which the “property”
shall be subjected [p. 314].
Lord Blackburn continued by saying that “the only safe rule”
was to interpret the “words of the enactments” in what he believed to be its historical context. The origin of the particular tax
definition of profits was related to the object of taxation, i.e. “to
grant a revenue at all events, even though a possible nearer
approximation to equality may be sacrificed in order more easily and certainly to raise that revenue” [p. 317]. He pointed out
that the words of the legislation in question resembled the poor
laws:24
24
Under 43 Eliz. ch. 2 parochial officials were permitted to tax inhabitants of
the parish on tithes, coalmines, and woodlands. This power to “rate” ended by
virtue of 3 & 4 Vict. ch. 96 and subsequent legislation.
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. . . [L]ong before any income or property tax was imposed for general revenue, the parochial authorities in
England raised a revenue . . . which was very much in
the nature of an income and property tax; and the language used in the Income Tax Acts is such as to convince me that the legislature had in their contemplation
what had been done in this branch of the law [p. 317].
He cited case law that disallowed deductions for “planting”
coalmines when calculating “the net annual value” of the produce of the mine for parochial poor law purposes. He does not
present the case as an authority for income tax, but as an indication of a matter that “must have been well known to that large
proportion of the legislators who habitually acted at quarter
sessions” [p. 318].
Lord Blackburn then turned to the history of the income tax
to support his argument. In defining Schedule A in the 180325
act, the legislature had:
. . . classed together in one schedule properties, such as
agricultural land, which from their nature will continue
permanently to exist, and properties, such as quarries,
which will certainly come to an end within a period . . .
which can be generally calculated, and properties, such
as iron works, which are real property, deriving their
annual value from being ancillary to a trade [pp. 318319].
On all such property, the legislation imposed the rule that the
“annual value” should be taxed and charged on an amount not
less than the property rating at the last poor rate. A deduction
for repairs was not generally available. To Lord Blackburn, this
cross-reference to the poor rate proved that the parochial tax
was in the legislators’ minds at the time. (The reference was
dropped in the 1806 and later acts.) On the basis of the historical link”, Lord Blackburn concluded that the requirement of
Schedule A, No. III to tax the annual value of mining properties
to be “understood to be the full amount for one year . . . of the
profits received therefrom” must mean “that which is produced
from them” [pp. 320-321].
Lord Blackburn then went on to link the idea of “annual
value” as calculated without any deduction in respect of “capital” to the taxation of “annual profits” under Schedule D:

25

43 Geo. 3. ch. 122, s. 31.
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In the [1842 act] the different schedules were kept apart
and complete in themselves, but I think wherever there
was any provision in any one of the schedules that
throws light on what is meant by annual value or annual profits or capital, it may be very material in construing the meaning of those words used in other parts
of the Act [p. 322].
Although subsequent cases supported Lord Blackburn’s
view that the Coltness case had significance for Schedule D,26 he
focused on those concerns specified in Schedule A No. III which
were “transferred” to Schedule D in 1866. He believed the purpose of the transfer was to give the Schedule A concerns the
benefit of “all the anxiously devised provisions for keeping the
returns under Schedule D. secret and confidential”. He argued
why he believed the principles of Schedule A calculation still
applied to these concerns. As pit-sinking expenses would be regarded as capital expenditure under general Schedule A principles, there was no need to interpret the Schedule D Case I, 3rd
Rule concerning particular types of capital expenditure. He
made clear, then, that he regarded the Addie case as correctly
decided, but for the wrong reason. The Knowles case as wrongly
decided, he said, because it rested on a misinterpretation of the
transfer of mines from Schedule A to Schedule D and a misunderstanding of the interpretation of a mine’s profit for the year
in the context of the tax law.27
The House of Lords decision in Coltness moved the tax
treatment of mining and other Schedule A No. III businesses
away from the treatment of trades and further still from the
practices of commercial accounting. This development was
counter to proposals advocated by politicians and popular protesters in the 1870s. Nonetheless, subsequent judicial decisions
confirmed the Coltness interpretation. In Mersey Docks and
Harbour Board v. Lucas [1883], the House of Lords confirmed
that the 1866 “transfer” of Schedule A No. III businesses to

26
The Alianza Company, Ltd. v. Bell [1904]; Court of Appeal, Master of the
Rolls (MR). See also Findlay, J. in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal,
MR in Golden Horse Shoe (New) Ltd. v. Thurgood [1933]. Also, in the Court of
Appeal, MR in Stow Bardolph Gravel Co., Ltd. v. Poole [1954], see the confirmation that there was no distinction between Schedule D and Schedule A No. III in
distinguishing “capital” from revenue expenses.
27
Lord Blackburn referred to the Forder case, but — strangely — as a repairs
case and did not review it further since he assumed it to be covered by the 1878
legislation concerning wear and tear.
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Schedule D only applied to the process of income taxation, not
the principles or substantive calculation of taxable profits. In the
same case, the Lords made clear that the “profits” of Schedule A
No. III businesses should be defined in terms of the property,
not the trade or enterprise.28 This case also cited the idea that
“profit” could be used “in the legal sense of the word, as meaning the profits of land” [p. 440], or, in the words of the Master of
the Rolls, “the net produce of the land” which was “the meaning
to be attributed to the word in the . . . 3rd [rule] in Schedule A”
[pp. 461-462].
The Limitations of the 1878 Statutory Depreciation Allowance:
Use of abstraction and historical interpretation to assign meanings to taxing words permitted the courts in Coltness to drive a
wedge of time between the meanings of “profits” for tax purposes and commercial “profits.” Once these concepts were separated in time, it became easier for the courts to recognize the
essential difference between “profits” measured for the different
purposes. In the transport depreciation cases discussed below,
the courts revealed their unwillingness to make calculations
themselves. In addition, the Caledonian Railway, Burnley Steamship, and Leith Steam Packet cases can be interpreted as revealing the courts’ unwillingness to adopt a liberal interpretation of
the 1878 allowance. Because of Coltness and the transport depreciation cases, the authority of the Revenue to distinguish
taxable profits from commercial profits increased, as did their
authority to make calculations.
Caledonian Railway Co. v. Banks [1880]: In 1880, prior to the
House of Lords decision in Coltness, the Scottish Court of Session heard a case that involved interpretation of the 1878 legislation as it applied to plant and machinery. In a hearing before
the Special Commissioners, representatives for the Company,

28
See, in particular, Lord Fitzgerald, who said “profit” in the context of
Schedule A No. III referred to “income acquired from the estate, of whatever
character it may be, over and above the costs and expenses of receipt and
collection.” The Lords accepted the judgement of Lord Blackburn, M.R., in the
Court of Appeal, and, effectively, Dicey’s argument for the Crown in Coltness.
Lord Blackburn said that he had based his argument “upon the similarity . . .
between the rules as to income tax and rules as to poor rate” and he went on to
say that “in estimating whether there are profits you are to look not at whether a
particular person derives profits, but whether the concern is a thing that brings
in an excess of receipts.”
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including an accountant, had argued that the company was entitled to allowances of £253,389 for repairs and renewals to locomotive power, carriages and wagons:
“Renewals” means the substitution of new locomotives
. . . for those worn out; . . . 24 new locomotives . . . were
better quality, and more expensive, than those of which
they were renewals. . . . [A] sum of 20,837l. [was] set
aside out of profits for renewals and repair [but] not yet
applied for that purpose. . . . By this expenditure . . . ,
according to the certificates of the Company’s locomotive superintendent, the Company’s property and plant
have been maintained in good working condition and
repair [p. 488].
In addition, the company claimed £185,391 for depreciation of
rolling stock, machinery, etc. Before the court, company counsel
argued that it was “impossible to keep the value of the plant up
to cost price;” annual repairs and renewals “only keeps it up to
75 per cent. Of cost price, therefore 25 per cent. has been consumed” [p. 492].
The court supported the decision of the Special Commissioners. The 1878 legislation, they said, permitted the Commissioners to find as a matter of fact that there had been a diminution in the value of plant and machinery due to wear and tear.
In this case, it was decided that the Commissioners had been
entitled to decide that there was no wear and tear to be compensated for by way of an estimated wear and tear allowance (the
depreciation). As Lord Gifford said, it was “fair and reasonable”
for the Commissioners to have permitted the company an allowance for the actual cost of repairs and renewals as an alternative
to an estimate of the wear and tear suffered during the year.
However, he thought it “quite clear . . . that the Railway company cannot get deduction for deterioration twice over — first,
by deducting the actual expenses of repair and renewal, and
then by deducting an additional estimated sum for the same
thing” [pp. 499-500]. The court did not accept that wear and tear
allowance should be given by reference to cost-based accrual
accounting; “diminution in value” of plant and machinery was
to be estimated by reference to value to the business, and if that
value was said by the company to be maintained then there was
no case for a wear and tear deduction beyond the value of the
repair and renewals required to maintain the value of productive capital. This view was consistent with the argument of the
Board of Inland Revenue in 1877 when the circular to General
Commissioners was issued [CIR, 1878b, p. 64]. However, the
Published by eGrove, 2002

47

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 29 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
152

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2002

court argued that the purpose of the 1878 change in legislation
was to permit a business to claim wear and tear allowances for a
diminution in value to the business that was not restored by
expenditure on repairs and renewals.
In the Caledonian Railway case, the court made its decision
with no apparent reference to the other depreciation cases; its
judgment rested on its interpretation of the words of the relevant legislation and it created its own interpretations for key
passages. For example, the “assessable value of the income for
the year” was equated with “clear profit realised” after “all the
outgoings which are necessary to attain the sum of gross profit
[are] deducted” [the L. J. Clerk, p. 493]. For a business, such as
the railway company, “value” of plant meant “capacity to earn
income,” not “value of the plant as merchantable or marketable
articles”; the first was “the only quality contemplated” under
income tax law [p. 496]. The Second Division saw no reason
why taxable profits should not equal accounting profits:
[T]he assessment has been made in entire accordance
with the Railway Company’s own accounts. . . . I see no
reason why the income tax . . . should not be fixed upon
the same principle as that which determines the dividend to the proprietors. . . . Surely no complaint can be
made if the Railway Company pay income tax only
upon what they themselves divide as dividend or net
profit [Lord Gifford, p. 500].
Although these views represented no lasting precedent after the
House of Lords decision in Coltness, they re-emphasize the
scope of interpretation of taxing words during the first fifty or
so years of income tax. It was not immediately evident to all
parts of the judiciary that there were large differences between
taxable and commercial profits. The Second Division of the
Scottish Court of Session had apparently not paid close attention to the income tax decisions of their First Division brethren,
such as Addie and how it was referred to in the higher courts.
Burnley Steamship Company v. Aikin [1894]: Another depreciation case was heard by the First Division of the Court of Session
in 1894. The company had claimed a deduction in respect of
depreciation of a ship because of loss of earning power and
market value due to the obsolescence of the ship. All the company had been allowed was a wear and tear allowance calculated as 5 per cent of cost on the reducing-balance basis. In
order to reflect the other causes of diminution in value, the
company argued that the rate should be 7.5 per cent.
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The court rejected the arguments of the company. Lord
McLaren summarized the reasoning:
It seems to me that [if] the depreciation which is
claimed [for loss of earning power] means . . . that the
vessel through competition with other vessels is less
able to earn freight during the remainder of its existence, then I think on the principle of the case of the
Coltness Iron Company . . . no deduction can be made
. . . because [income tax] assessment is not made upon
capital but upon income, and the principle of the Act is
that you pay Income Tax upon a subject which may be
continually diminishing in value, and when it is exhausted you have no longer any tax to pay because the
income ceases [p. 277].
Lord McLaren concluded that “wear and tear means nothing
more than the physical depreciation of the subject apart from its
being rendered less useful by the discovery of better machinery
or better models of doing the same thing” [ibid.].
Leith, Hull, and Hamburg Steam Packet Company v. Bain [1897]:
This final depreciation case also concerned allowance for wear
and tear. The company had calculated depreciation at 7.5 per
cent, whereas the General Commissioners considered that 5.5
per cent was adequate:
[T]he Commissioners by a majority found as a fact that
the normal life of a steam vessel may be reasonably
taken as at least 22 years, and that [it] followed as a
matter of arithmetical calculation that an annual allowance of 5 per cent. on the reducing value, with compound interest at the rate of 3 per cent., will recoup the
original capital expenditure; or in other words, meet the
depreciation of wear and tear [p. 562].
The company contended that the allowance calculated by the
Commissioners did not conform to the 1878 legislation. Based
on its own evidence and that of “eleven other principal shipowners of Leith,” the company mustered a number of alternative
calculations that were more favorable in its view, and, of course,
larger.
The Surveyor countered by saying that an allowance spread
over a “considerable number of years” and was consistent with
the judgment in Caledonian Railway [1880] which “permitted
the trader to keep up his plant and replace it when it is worn
out”. Further, he argued that sinking fund calculations of the
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sort were “in ordinary use” for depreciation as “shewn by reference to the published evidence of Mr. Lass, F.I.C.A., London, in
the Falkirk Gas Arbitration case” [pp. 563-564].
Despite (or perhaps because of) the large amount of evidence placed before it, the court decided that it would confirm
the Commissioners’ decision because it seemed that the allowance given had been judged to be “fair and reasonable” as a
matter of fact. However, the court made it very clear that it
found the case to be “abominably badly stated” and that they
could find no “question . . . raised which we can entertain” [p.
567]. Calculation, therefore, was a factual matter for others to
decide, not the courts.
DISCUSSION
The depreciation tax cases reveal conflicting views of the
principles, practices, and meanings for taxing words that should
govern calculation. The ways in which conflict was resolved and
the institutional politics underlying the process had lasting consequences for the development of modern depreciation accounting, clarification of distinctions between tax and commercial
accounting concepts of profits, and the emergence of modern
regulatory control of taxpayers. Each of these themes is developed below.
Accounting for Depreciation: Bryer [1998] argues that a capitalrevenue theory of profit measurement and capital maintenance
was widely accepted by accountants and judges. His view is
supported by the systematic distinction between capital and revenue made by taxpayers in the depreciation cases. (The depreciation claims made in the tax depreciation cases are summarized in Table 1). We find evidence that some companies
adopted more than one method of accounting for capital at a
time. Some cases mixed repairs and renewals, replacement, or
depreciation accounting. Confusion between depreciation as an
allocation of cost or as a provision for replacement is evident in
these cases, just as it is evident in commercial accounting
[Napier, 1990].
The cases emphasize different aspects of accounting for
capital. In Addie, depreciation was conceptualized as an allocation of cost, adjusted for residual value, over the useful life of
assets. A range of detailed methods for estimating the portion of
cost consumed were presented, expressed as “deterioration” in
or “exhaustion of” the “value” of capital in some cases [Knowles,
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Coltness]. Depreciation was integral to maintenance of financial
[Caledonian Railway] and operating capital [Burnley Steamship]
through the provision of the cost of eventual replacement of
capital assets. In Knowles, the businessmen recognized that “exhausted capital” required provision for replacement, and the
company’s counsel argued that capital should be recognized as
it circulated from one form (coal deposits) into cash and then
back into the original form (coal deposits) again [see Knowles,
1877, pp. 164-165]. Depreciation was not a simple matter of
allocating historic cost to the time periods in which the asset
was used, but it had to include an element to recognize the
problems of obsolescence and technical improvements in capital
assets [Burnley Steamship]. Businesses recognized the inability
of repairs to maintain “cost price” [Caledonian Railway].
Companies could be quite flexible in how they explained the
need for depreciation. In Coltness [1879, 1881] the company
tried three separate explanations before the courts. The Leith
Steam Packet case reveals that local officials were prepared to go
into great commercial and arithmetical detail to find “fair and
reasonable” deductions, rather than arbitrary measures for depreciation. It is also clear from that case, that the company’s
preferred method of depreciation considered the commercial
circumstances of each of its steamships individually.
The problems of profit measurement, capital accounting
and depreciation were matters that judges in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords would have encountered from corporate cases referred from other divisions of the High Court of
Justice, such as the dividend cases from Chancery. These issues
were, however, relatively unfamiliar to the lower courts. The
Exchequer courts in England and Scotland did not deal with
dividend and insolvency cases. As a preamble to his decision in
the Caledonian Railway case [1880], the Lord Justice Clerk noted
that questions of measuring railway profits and depreciation
were questions “with which we are not generally familiar, and
that fact has rendered the discussion and the consideration of it
somewhat difficult” [p. 493]. Judges expressed appreciation
when cases were “divested of arithmetical details, which do not
affect the matter” and reduced to “simple propositions”
[Caledonian Railway]. Reflecting the court’s confusion concerning the Leith Steam Packet case [1897], the Lord President said:
“It is one of the characteristic peculiarities of this Case that no
one can tell with confidence what is the question raised, or
indeed what the Commissioners decided, beyond the arithmetical results” [p. 567]. After three days of hearings that covered
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the minutiae of depreciation calculations, the Lord President
found the case to consist of “a farrago of facts, evidence, opinion, argument, authority, and illustration” and to be “so egregious a failure” that he could do nothing else than dismiss the
taxpayer’s appeal [p. 568].
The ease with which judges were able to conceptualize depreciation varied considerably. In Forder, Pollock, B. indicated
that he thought the purpose of the recognition of depreciation in
commercial accounts was indeterminate. In his view, depreciation was something that occurred or was realized at a point in
time. He could understand how coal capital was consumed in a
mine, but calling the consumption “depreciation” created a
problem of “nomenclature” [Knowles]. Huddleston, J. equated
depreciation with a provision for expenses of renewal [Forder].
Although judges sometimes expressed themselves as understanding why a commercial man needed to recognize the consumption of capital, they associated this practice with an economic concept of depreciation [Coltness, Blackburn, L.].29
Some judges displayed difficulty in understanding the principles and practices of depreciation, while others evidently saw
the commercial and economic point. Meanwhile, the depreciation concept that emerged for tax purposes was very narrowly
defined and tied to words of law written at the start of the 19th
century. The express words of Schedule D law permitted deductions for “repairs,” but disallowed capital costs defined in various ways. The way in which the 1878 wear and tear allowance
was interpreted made it an extension of the “repairs” allowance
that already existed. Thus, Lord McLaren defined acceptable tax
“depreciation” (i.e. the allowance for wear and tear) in terms of
the maintenance of physical capital [Burnley Steamship] rather
than by reference to the maintenance of financial capital, operating capital, or realizable capital, which are all capital maintenance concepts touched upon in the cases.
Business had changed between the time income tax was
introduced and the 1880s when Coltness was decided. Trade and
industry had grown in importance to the economy, while agriculture had experienced relative decline. Businesses were increasingly complex and geographically expansive. Mining and
other Schedule A businesses operated and were organized in a
manner much more akin to general trading concerns. From the
29
The variability of judges’ ease in conceptualising depreciation and related
accounting concepts was also evident in the depreciation cases [e.g. Reid, 1987;
Bryer, 1998].
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detail presented in the cases, it seems clear that businesses were
adapting to their changing commercial environment by developing detailed, thoughtful, and systematic methods of providing
depreciation in the last quarter of the 19th century. When it
came to details, Surveyors were just as capable as businessmen
of using sophisticated methods of calculation. The Edinburgh
Surveyor supported the case for standardization of sinking-fund
method depreciation, based on broad industry averages, for purposes of granting tax relief to the taxpayers in the particular
industry. Standardized percentages for wear and tear allowances, calculated on a reducing balance basis appear, therefore,
to have been favored by the Revenue [viz. Leith Steam Packet].
While the tax depreciation cases reveal that commercial depreciation was provided to cover diminution in value from four
causes — wear and tear, exhaustion, loss of earning power, and
obsolescence — tax authorities and the courts were prepared to
give depreciation allowances only for the wear and tear portion.
Several accounting studies emphasize the influence of the
tax treatment of depreciation on the development of accounting
theory and practices [Edwards, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman,
1979]. The tax depreciation cases provide some evidence of tax
influence on depreciation reporting [viz. SC, 1877 (Chadwick)
cf. Baldwin and Berry, 1999]. However, what is most evident is
that commercial depreciation accounting developed despite the
emergence of a tax system of depreciation which was quite limited and predicated on quite distinct principles. Bryer’s [1993, p.
657] argument that depreciation accounting developed for reasons other than the 1878 wear and tear allowance seems convincing. Cases after 1878 indicate that businesses continued to
charge depreciation despite their shrinking hopes of obtaining
tax allowances. This evidence is consistent with Bryer’s contention [1993] and Baldwin and Berry’s [1999] evidence that depreciation was usually charged, even if it was not reported.
Cases like Caledonian Railway highlighted the problem of
treating depreciation as an allowance for “wear and tear.” If
operating capital could be maintained by repair, then, the tax
authorities asked, why is depreciation necessary? “For the eventual replacement of capital” was not an acceptable answer. Undoubtedly, the emerging distinctions between the two will have
sharpened the nature of the depreciation debates as Watts and
Zimmerman [1979] suggest.
Concepts of profit: Many General Commissioners continued to
regard “nett profit” or “clear profit” as calculated for purposes of
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commercial accounting as the basis for taxing businesses on
their profits. The courts and the Surveyors gradually enforced
their interpretation of “profits” in tax law as something quite
distinct. Residues of late-18th century conceptualizations of
business guided income tax rules, given the way the Revenue
and the courts chose to interpret the taxing words. In practice,
these residues limited the scope of subsequent tax statute and
case law changes.
The amount taxable was an “annual amount.” Tax legislation made clear that the Schedule D taxable amount was “profits” for a particular year or average of years, adjusted for the
specific injunctions contained in the legislation, such as the disallowance of “any capital withdrawn”, “any sum employed or
intended to be employed as capital”, or “any capital employed in
improvement of premises” [see Figure 1]. The early depreciation
cases [Addie, Forder] made clear the necessity of recognizing
“profits” and then making adjustments in accordance with tax
law. Later cases [beginning with Coltness] made clear that the
concept of “profits” underlying the taxing acts was essentially
different from the concept applied in commercial accounting
practice or in the dividend cases under company law. In Mersey
Docks a distinct legal concept of “profits of land” was recognized. This principle at first applied only to Schedule A No. III
businesses. However, subsequent case law extended the principle of essential difference to Schedule D Case I businesses [e.g.
Alianza, 1904].
In the tax depreciation cases the essential difference between the concepts of profit was established first through literal
interpretation of the law and then by construing words in what
was deduced to be their historical context and the intention of
Parliament. Well-established practices of legal interpretation, reinforced by the provision in the income tax act that “it shall not
be lawful to make any other deductions . . . then such as are
expressly enumerated in this act” [fn. 19 supra], focused Revenue attention on the words of the act. They used these words as
weapons to make taxpayers and General Commissioners conform to their understanding of how the income tax should operate. Once income tax appeals could be taken to the courts,
judges dissected and combined words and meanings. Pollock, B.
in Knowles, understood the “balance of profits and gains” as the
commercial profits available for appropriation. In Coltness,
judges added the word “full” to get “full balance of profits”
which placed the relevant concept of profits for income tax
firmly in the historical context of property taxes.
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Elements of the principle of strict interpretation were evident in these judgments: in a taxing act one has to look at the
“express words” [Coltness, High Court, Lord President] and
there is no equity in a taxing statute [Forder]. Tiley and Collison
[1999, pp. 15-16] write:
The literal interpretation . . . had . . . two consequences.
The first is that it is for the Crown to establish that the
subject falls within the charge. This means that if the
words are ambiguous the subject is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But the principle is not that the subject
is to have the benefit if, on any argument that ingenuity
can suggest, the Act does not appear perfectly accurate
but only if, after careful examination of all the clauses, a
judicial mind still entertains reasonable doubts as to
what the legislature intended: . . . if there is no ambiguity
then words must take their natural meaning (italics
added).
Historical interpretation was part of the “ingenuity” by which
judicial minds could overcome ambiguity. Lord Blackburn employed these practices in Coltness. In that case, he also signaled
the extension of the judgment to apply to Schedule D Case I.
This involved another principle of interpretation: that words
used in the same context in different statutes may be construed
in the same way [Tiley and Collison, 1999, p. 18].
Judicial practices of interpretation were adopted as Inland
Revenue practices. Revenue representatives argued that allowances for capital were disallowed because the income tax was a
“temporary tax”. The court decisions examined in this paper did
not directly support the Revenue’s historical interpretation. Instead, judges were concerned to determine which concept of
“profits” legislators must have had in mind when they drafted
the relevant words of legislation. The historical interpretation in
Coltness rested on the House of Lords’ understanding that the
profits taxed by the income tax were the annual return on property or reward for effort. The annual return on property was
conceptualized as it had been for much older British property
taxes (e.g. parochial rates). It was probably significant that the
concepts and practices of accounting for capital as it was consumed were not well developed or consistently applied in the
late 18th century when the original principles of the income tax
were developed. Instead, the concepts found by the courts were
more consistent with aristocratic accounting operated in the
context of agricultural estates [cf. Napier, 1997].
Interpretation of income tax law in its historical context, as
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was done in Coltness, firmly tied late 19th century income tax
concepts to the concepts that courts believed had applied to the
words at the end of the 18th century. This allowed them to
disassociate the broad categories of costs for the year that could
be deducted to arrive at profit from the then current commercial
practices or the actual practices of the particular taxpayers. A
distinction between “income” and “capital” was regarded by the
courts as fundamental to the taxing acts, and a distinction that
must be created by judicial means, rather than natural understanding, when dealing with property which derived value from
being affiliated with a trade. The “fruit” of agricultural land
could be seen to follow the “planting” of seed. The “fruit,” or
coal, of a mine was visible when brought to the surface, even if
the process of “planting” the “tree”, the underground mine, was
obscure. Property as the “tree” generating an annual “fruit” was
an old idea, but still in circulation owing to the popularity of
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.30
Regulatory control of income taxation: The distinctive tax meaning of “profits” led to larger tax assessments than a commercial
meaning would have. Revenue officers had strong motivations
for enforcing the distinction. Inland Revenue officers seemed to
taxpayers to be intent on “getting as much as they can” in tax
revenue [SC, 1861, q. 4102, Gooch]. Revenue officers expressed
impatience with local Commissioners who collected less tax
than they should or could [e.g. SC, 1861, Welsh] and “performed
no function which they could avoid” [Riddle, 1887, pp. 118-119].
They complained about their lack of “control” over the Commissioners and their subordinates [SC, 1861, q. 2161, Welsh]. Surveyors, the Revenue officers working in local tax offices, fell
under the supervision of traveling supervisors and accountants
[Lamb, 2001, p. 282]. The “crushing nature” of pressure to be
effective from Somerset House in London was a feature of a
rigid regime of accountability on local officers under which “the
30
Adam Smith’s description [1776, Bk. 1, Ch. 6] of capital as the “tree” and
income as its “fruit” became a metaphor used by politicians, judges, and others
to describe the tax distinction [Boden, 1999; Daunton, 2001, p. 206]. Smith uses
agricultural metaphors to describe mining [1776, Bk. 1, Ch. 11, part II]. In
Coltness Lord Blackburn cites the words “planting the mine” from eighteen
century statute, but he is wary of applying the agricultural land metaphor to
land that does not “grow” crops in a literal way. Later cases were less scrupulous
in applying the metaphor and it came to be used in a very general sense. In Pool
v Guardian Investment Trust Co. Limited [1921], Sankey, J. refers to the concept,
as developed in the US Supreme Court case Eisner v Macomber [1919].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5

56

mb: Defining profits for British income tax purposes: A contextual study of the depreciation cases, 1875-18
Lamb: Defining “Profits” for British Income Tax Purposes

161

Board of Inland Revenue made the Surveyors feel the weight of
their displeasure when anything went wrong” [Riddell, 1887, pp.
118-119, 131]. Accounting for assessments and the provision of
statistical data to head office was a responsibility of Surveyors
and involved “wandering through an interminable maze of figures, heaping results on results without any system” [op. cit., pp.
141-143]. In the 1870s practical technical training was gained on
the job, and consisted of review of notebooks compiled by officers who were more senior and experienced, and also careful
study of the words of statute [op. cit., pp. 86, 87, 109]. All of
these factors suggest the accuracy of Gooch’s assertion that Revenue officers did their jobs well if they were “getting as much as
they can”.
Inland Revenue authority in tax administration was enhanced once the courts expressed their approval for the quasijudicial practices of interpretation adopted as Revenue practices. The courts’ approval, however, required judges themselves
to confront the ambiguity of meanings for taxing words. In dealing with the ambiguity of tax law by constructing their own
distinction between commercial accounting and tax calculations, the courts were in one sense doing nothing more than
following their own practices of legal construction. It is argued
in this paper that the construction of certainty in judicial minds
through practices of interpretation of the historical context in
which the words of statute were written suited the courts, and
the House of Lords in particular, in the 1870s and 1880s for
other reasons. Ambiguous words of statute, as “profits” was,
might, alternatively, have been construed according to its ordinary meaning, such as the commercial meaning of profits.
The courts were required to recognize that a taxing act had
“to grant a revenue at all events” [Coltness, Blackburn, L.]. This
placed a regulatory obligation upon them. A large body of judicial precedent existed in dividend cases [Reid, 1987; Bryer,
1998] by 1878 when the Court of Appeal and the Lords became
direct involved in the income tax appeal structure. Therefore,
these courts were familiar with ordinary meanings for profits in
a commercial context and had developed their own body of precedent for the meaning of the word. Keeping those meanings
away from the meaning that would attach to the word for tax
purposes was important for reinforcing the literal meaning of
the tax law as well as to ensure that the courts could fulfill their
regulatory obligations without creating conflicting, but unjustified, meanings for words like “profits” that appeared in both
contexts.
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The Court of Appeal used historical interpretation to define
“capital”, and by extension “profits” available for distribution, in
the Lee case [1889]. The judges used Adam Smith’s distinction
between “fixed” and “circulating” capital as the route to a new
way of interpreting “capital”. Superficially, this was a similar
pattern of going backward in time to interpret the words of a
contemporary act that we saw in Coltness. What was significant
was the fact that by pushing interpretation back into historical
time, the Lords could side-step arguments that “profits” needed
to be something specified in non-abstract terms or that tax and
commercial measurements of profits should be the same.
In Lee, the Court of Appeal went backward not for the same
definition of capital that would apply for taxation, but for a
different, economic definition. One interpretation of this case is
that the court actively sought to support broad social objectives:
such as, the interests of social capital [Bryer, 1998] or unfettered
rational movement of economic capital [French, 1977]. The
court’s wish to create leeway for the definition of “profits” for
dividend purposes potentially created conflicts with its obligation to protect the Exchequer, that is, to standardize (and probably maximize) the definition of taxable profits. Literal interpretation in much earlier historical contexts helped create legal
meanings that taxpayers and litigants would have difficulty
bringing together. Effectively, therefore, historical interpretation
was a strategy to avoid the regulatory conflicts that might occur
if other principles of statutory interpretation were applied, viz.
ordinary meanings, or exporting a meaning for a word from one
area of law to another. Especially after Lee, it would not have
done at all, given the courts’ responsibility to “grant a revenue at
all events”, for the permissive definition of “profits” in the dividend cases to migrate to income tax cases.
Judicial decisions across the regulatory range could be
more easily reconciled if the courts kept meanings abstract and
did not get too specific about particular measurement principles
and practices. Therefore, the failure of late 19th century British
courts to make detailed accounting rules to define “profits” and
“capital” may not reflect a “slump in judicial self-confidence”
[Maltby, 1999]. Arguably, this position left room for judicial
manoeuvrability. The courts remained free to interpret concepts
such as “profits”, “capital”, and “depreciation” in different ways
for competing regulatory purposes, maintain the possibility of
judicial law reform [French, 1977], and avoid the loss of legal
control that tends to go along with reliance on formalist approaches [McBarnet and Whelan, 1992, p. 104]. The courts’
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reluctance to calculate meant that judges could adopt calculations based on meanings that were defined by other parties who
were not bound by case precedent or principles of statutory
interpretation. They could also choose to ignore certain meanings and calculations. For example, supporting evidence in Lee
on the meaning of “profits” that was derived from Coltness [fn.
22 supra] could be ignored because the abstract concepts were
distinct. The judiciary avoided a regulatory conflict in the two
spheres of its adjudication by pushing factual calculation onto
others (e.g. by acceptance of calculation derived from company
articles of association or by income tax calculations to be
worked out by Revenue and local tax officials). Thus, they kept
the flexibility to avoid inconsistent judgments.31
Paradoxically, once the essential difference between “profits” for tax and accounting purposes had been established with
the Coltness decision, it was possible for the courts to institutionalize a link between the two practices of profit measurement. This was done in Gresham [1892] which decided that
profits should be recognized according to “the ordinary principles of commercial accountancy” [Freedman, 1987]. This
“commonsensical approach” [Boden, 1999] constrained a Revenue tendency to define every principle of tax calculation in its
own terms, which had been reinforced by the Coltness decision.
By then it was accepted in judicial law and Revenue practice
that commercial net profits merely represented the starting
point of a calculative process of adjustment that dealt with the
matters expressly enumerated by legislation — including the
1878 depreciation allowance — and those matters necessary to
reflect the essential differences between profit concepts for tax
and accounting that had been clarified by case law, such as, the
disallowance of accounting “depreciation”. Subsequent debate
before the courts extended, and sometimes reversed, the adjustments required to commercial accounting calculations to reflect
the essential difference of the tax concept of profits [see Freedman, 1987, 1993, 1995, 1997]. The institutionalized connection
created by Gresham, however, has ensured that the profit mea-

31
Of course, it is possible that judges in the dividend cases were accommodating their own vulnerabilities or lack of precise understanding of principles
and practice. Accounting historians who have studied the dividend cases, and
the responses to them, make clear the variability in the judges’ grasp of the
detailed accounting issues involved. In that sense, they may just have wished to
keep away from complex calculation.
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sures, while required to be essentially different, also remain
essentially connected.
CONCLUSIONS
Judicial support gave the Inland Revenue the upper hand in
tax administration. With this support, it became possible to construct de facto regulatory control of the income tax. Taxing practices based on writing, interpretation, and examination of texts,
and extended calculation were reinforced. These practices
formed the basis for the disciplinary power of the modern Revenue and supplanted taxation based on the exercise of sovereign
power. This change had permanent effects on the way in which
tax calculation was conceptualized in the UK and the process by
which taxation was extracted from the taxpaying population.
Through analysis of the tax depreciation cases we have begun to
see the emergence of modern modes of tax governance. The
cases also reveal the lingering importance of the historically specific concepts of “profits”, “property” and “capital” that underlie
the early income tax.
A shift in the form of regulatory control over British taxation occurred after 1855 [Lamb, 2001]. Following Hoskin and
Macve [1986, 1994], the change can be seen as a shift in modes
of governance from one based on the exercise of sovereign
power to one based on accountability. In this new accountability, the disciplining technologies of managers create self-disciplining subjects, who in turn reinforce and extend the disciplinary power of the managers.32 Hoskin and Macve base their
theorizing on organizational and management studies of private
sector business, but comparable changes can be discerned in
public sector management.33 The construction of accountability
for income tax rests firstly on the regulator gaining the power to

32
This part of their theorising is based on an understanding of the nature
and emergence of “disciplinary power” based on a reading of Foucault [1975],
and as developed by others [including, Boland, 1987; Miller and O’Leary, 1987;
Preston, 1989; Miller, 1990, 1994].
33
I am grateful to Keith Hoskin for helping to make this point clear. In
describing my work [Lamb, 1997a], he writes: “The new tax regime is derived
from a new application of the old techne of accounting, to “know” people as
subjects in a new way, as income and profit “earners” — a knowledge which
(like modern tax) can only be extracted from these subjects by getting them to
render an account of their monetary value, which is then done via the accounts
which either they keep or which are kept on them, and translated into a tax
‘return’” [Hoskin, 1997, p. 7].
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regulate and then on the ability to define routines of regulated
calculation. If such calculation becomes “regulating calculation”, or internalized routines of accountability, for taxpayers,
then those taxpayers become more knowable and governable
and the taxing system becomes more autonomous and less reliant on the actual exercise of power by tax officials.34 The shift in
the form of regulatory control of income tax accelerates after
the Revenue’s de facto authority to define regulated calculation
for tax purposes gains the support of the courts. Regulatory
control over a large population of geographically dispersed taxpayers is more complete when based on disciplinary technologies than it would be if based on the exercise of sovereign power
alone [Lamb, 2001].
The high degree of “voluntary compliance” that was a feature of mid- to- late 19th century British taxation [Daunton,
2001] and late 20th century British taxation [Preston, 1989] is a
product, in part, of pervasive “regulating calculation.” Analysis
of the depreciation cases in this paper has permitted us to trace
some of the ways that Inland Revenue regulators gained the
power to regulate and then to define routines of regulated calculation. If accounting is a form of economic calculation with the
potential to create disciplinary power [Miller, 1990], then it
makes sense for us to investigate and understand how the routines of accounting calculation formed in tax practice. This paper has highlighted the ways that meanings for taxing words,
principles, and practices have been contested and constructed in
dealing with Schedule D and Schedule A businesses. By the end
of the 19th century, British commercial accounting and tax
practice had achieved a considerable degree of general acceptance and understanding of the meanings and calculations of
“income” vs. “capital, as well as “profits” and “depreciation” in
particular contexts.
Essential to the modern disciplinary power of the Revenue
is comprehensive knowledge of the taxpayer gained through
writing, examination, and calculation. The whole process of tax
appeal to the courts is based on writing: first the case stated,
then the judgments, next their dissemination, and finally their
application as precedent. This process of appeal contrasts with
the appeal process based on calling the taxpayer to account and

34
A distinction between “regulated calculation” and “regulating calculation”
emerged as a form of shorthand from discussions with Keith Hoskin, and I
acknowledge his contribution.
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the final judgment of the General Commissioners that previously applied [Lamb, 2001]. The depreciation cases provide evidence that tax calculation was moving away from a reliance on
estimation based on what was known and knowable about a
business locally, to a reliance on information and calculations
presented in written commercial accounts. Assessment in these
cases was based on figures for profits and depreciation taken
from accounts [Forder, Handyside, Coltness] or derived in collaboration with experts [Leith Steam Packet]. Although the
courts judged the details of calculation to be matters of fact on
which they were not required to make judgments, their decisions were used to support Surveyors’ rationalization of what
could be regarded as “fair and reasonable” allowance for wear
and tear [Leith Steam Packet]. While it was certainly the case
that these practices (especially the routine submission of accounts) had not yet become the norm across the wide range of
taxpayers [Sabine, 1966, p. 138], it was significant that the general acceptability of the practices was presented in court to and
by judges who had the power to define and enforce taxing practices.
The tax cases reveal how the Revenue asserted its technical
authority over the commercial principles applied by many Commissioners. Appeals were brought by Surveyors who disagreed
with the commercial basis of the decision by the Commissioners
[Forder]. The courts accepted Revenue assertions of technical
definitions and tax calculations in preference to taxpayers’ commercial arguments, except in Knowles and Caledonian Railway,
cases that created no lasting precedents. The creation of technical definitions, such as those articulated by Revenue counsel
Dicey [Knowles, Coltness], transformed “profits” from something
that could be estimated on the basis of judgment, local knowledge, and commercial understanding into something that had to
be derived with precision. The derivation rested, first, on the
close reading of historical texts and, then, careful calculation
according to the application of prescribed rules of written legislation, case precedent, and tax returns. These technical practices
of taxation were not practices that the General Commissioners
were likely to find easy to lead. They were part-time, unpaid
laymen, many of whom found it difficult to find the time to
attend appeal hearings [e.g. SC, 1852a, q. 2159]. They relied
upon their clerks and, increasingly, on the Revenue officers for
legal knowledge and skills.
Before the depreciation cases, considerable social and political tension was created by the uncertainty over how profits
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss1/5
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should be calculated for income tax purposes and the fact that
local authorities adopted different practices in different parts of
Britain. Grievances also focused on the less generous tax treatment of mining businesses compared with other trading enterprises. The court decisions made it clear that income tax profits
would not equal commercial calculations. Reinforcement of
Revenue authority and practices by the courts meant that income tax practice could and would become more uniform
across Britain. The court decisions meant that mining companies were treated only marginally more harshly than trading
companies by tax law. The principles established by the courts
were not generous to taxpayers, but the outcomes created
greater certainty and their publicity helped standardize and accustom taxpayers to the tax.
While the depreciation tax cases reveal how de facto taxing
power began to shift in the direction of the Revenue, they also
reveal just how slow the process of creating a new mode of
governance over taxation was. The courts did not immediately
accept all of the arguments and analyses of the Inland Revenue.
In Addie and Forder, the courts accepted that the commercial
concept of “profits” was modified by the express words of the
Acts, but only in Coltness did the House of Lords accept the
argument of essential difference. Legal decisions took time to be
absorbed into practice, and might not be noticed if made by
courts outside the jurisdiction in which the taxpayers, Commissioners, or judges operated. This was evident from the Knowles
and Caledonian Railway cases. Inland Revenue interpretations of
new law took a very long time to be understood and supported
by the courts, and accepted by local Commissioners and taxpayers as guiding practice. It took 25 years for the Revenue’s interpretation of the scope of the 1866 “transfer” of Schedule A No.
III companies to Schedule D Case I to be accepted. In Knowles
the court explicitly rejected the narrow interpretation articulated by Dicey, but the House of Lords finally accepted it in
Coltness. The narrow scope of the 1878 wear and tear allowance
took a decade and a half to sort out.
Use of case law for accounting history has been regarded as
“particularly formidable” because “accounting principles and
practices were discussed in a relatively large number of early
business actions [that] span a bewildering variety of different
causes” [Mills, 1993, p. 766]. Cutting a swathe of analysis and
argument through the multitude of connections and lines of
interpretation in these texts necessarily involves a narrowing of
focus that risks a failure to notice matters of significance. This
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paper represents a first attempt to make important links between the histories of accounting, tax practice, and judicial decisions that help explicate the construction of adequate regulatory
control over British income tax. Undoubtedly there are many
avenues of research left to explore.
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